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ABSTRACT
There is significant public attention to the airline industry in the United States. Much of this
attention, whether in the form of media coverage, government inquiries or public complaints,
focuses on the low level of customer service and high levels of customer dissatisfaction in the
industry. In this thesis, we present the results of a customer survey to understand the causes of
dissatisfaction, and, based on this understanding, make an assessment of the current government
and industry approaches for improving satisfaction. Results indicate that flight delay and
cancellation, missing luggage and negative customer-employee interactions most impact
customer dissatisfaction. Results also indicate that while current government regulation (airline
Customer First plans) appropriately addresses customer needs, the problems of system
congestion and competition are the underlying drivers of negative customer service upon which
regulators need to focus.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
There is currently significant public attention to the airline industry in the United States.
Much of this attention, whether it is in the form of media coverage, government inquiries or
public complaints, focuses on the low level of customer service and high levels of customer
dissatisfaction in the industry. Recognizing that continued customer dissatisfaction can lead to
poor financial performance or government regulation, airlines have developed "Customer First"
plans. The primary components of these plans are:
- Timely provision of accurate information to customers, especially regarding delays and
fares
= Meeting essential customer needs
m Timely response to customer complaints
" On-time baggage delivery
While these plans suggest that airlines know exactly what to do to meet customer expectations
and needs, the public's basic understanding of customer expectation and desires is poor. Thus,
there is a need for research into the airline customer experience to further understand which
aspects are most critical to a positive experience.
In response to this need, we have conducted a customer survey with a convenient
customer segment of airline travelers: business school students. The study focuses on
understanding the causes of dissatisfaction for this segment and, based on this understanding,
assessing the current approaches in the U.S. for improving satisfaction.
The study is organized into four chapters. In the first chapter, the motivations for this
research are addressed. Airline customer complaints, media coverage about airline service and
government attention to airline customer service are discussed as motivations. In the second
chapter, existing studies and data on airline customer service are examined. In the third chapter,
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the research objective and approach of this study is discussed. In the fourth chapter, the results
of the research are discussed and implications are drawn.
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Chapter 2. Motivation for Research on Airline Customer Dissatisfaction
2.1. Customer Complaints
By all measures, the volume of customer complaints about the airline industry has grown
over the past five years. The standard industry metric for measuring customer complaints is the
number of complaints received by the Department of Transportation (D.O.T.) and published in
the Air Travel Consumer Report. Each month, this report tracks the number of complaints
received by the D.O.T. for each airline and categorizes each complaint. As shown in the figure
below, the D.O.T. received 7.7 complaints per million enplaned passenger in 1997. In 2000,
they received 29.8 complaints per million enplaned passengers. This represents a 385% growth
in complaints and a compound annual growth rate of 57%.
DOT Airline Complaints per Million Enplaned Passengers
30
25
20
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10
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1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Figure 1. Growth in Complaints to Department of Transportation
It is important to understand what drove this growth in customer complaints. In February 1998,
the D.O.T. began accepting customer complaints via e-mail. One can argue that sending a
complaint by e-mail is easier than making a phone call or writing and sending a letter. If this is
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true, growth in complaints could be higher than the growth in actual customer discontent. In the
fourth quarter 2000, the D.O.T. began measuring how many complaints arrived through e-mail,
letter and phone. This breakdown is shown in the table below:
Table 1. Distribution of Complaints to Department of Transportation
Complaint Vehicle Percent Last Quarter 2000 Percent First 5 Months 2001
E-mail 42.0% 32.2%
Letter 51.7% 60.4%
Phone 6.3% 7.4%
Since the last quarter 2000, e-mail has represented between 32% and 42% of complaints. If we
reduce the number of complaints between 1998 and 2000 by 42%, then the growth in complaints
from 1997 to 2000 is still 230% and the compound annual growth rate is 32%. Thus, growth in
complaints in the past three years is still 32% annually even if we completely remove the e-mail
factor.
This analysis is conservative because it underestimates the number of complaints
customers have about the airlines. The analysis assumes a constant 42% rate of adoption of e-
mail complaints since 1998, though the actual adoption rate most likely grew from nothing in
early 1998 to its current rate. Also, it assumes that all 42% of e-mail complaints are submitted
only because of ease of submission and are not reflective of actual customer discontent.
Another criticism of the Department of Transportation complaint data is the low
frequency of complaints. In 2000, for example, there were 30 complaints per million enplaned
passengers. On the surface this number appears small. However, additional analysis shows this
number may under-represent consumer discontent. The Department of Transportation Inspector
General released a report on airline customer service in February, 2001, which suggested for
every complaint to the D.O.T., airlines receive between 100 and 400 complaints from
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customers.' In addition, literature on customer complaints suggests that only 5% of customers
with a complaint make the effort to send the complaint to the service provider.2 Approximately
one-third of U.S. airline passengers are connecting passengers, 3 so for every million passengers
there are only about 700,000 individual passengers. Combining this data together in the table
below, we see that between 8.6% and 34.3% of U.S. airline passengers have a complaint about
the airline industry. This figure is much higher than the original 30 per 1,000,000 enplanements.
Table 2. Estimating Percent of Customers with a Complaint to Airlines
Step in Analysis & Data Manipulation Result of Step
Data to Begin
1) 30 complaints per Multiply complaints by 100-400 3,000-12,000 complaints per
1,000,000 enplanements complaints to airlines per 1,000,000 enplanements to
coplinit to DOT ailines per complaint toDO
2) 3,000-12,000 Multiply complaints by 20 60,000-240,000 complaints per
complaints per 1,000,000 (since 5% of customers with a 1,000,000 enplanements to
enplanements to airlines complaint actually voice it) airlines per complaint to DOT
per complaint to DOT
3) 60,000-240,000 Weight enplanements down by 60,000-240,000 complaints per
complaints per 1,000,000 1/3 since this many passengers 700,000 airlines passengers
enplanements to airlines are connecting (8.6% - 34.3%)
per complaint to DOT
Other sources of customer complaints beyond the Department of Transportation are
various consumer complaint websites. Similar to D.O.T. complaint data, data from these sites
suggest high consumer discontent with the airlines. Sites like www.eComplaints.com,
www.epinions.com, and www.planetfeedback.com offer consumers an online destination to issue
complaints or opinions about any company they wish. Data from eComplaints below suggests
1 See Aviation Customer Service Improvement Act (S.319), p. 3
2 Data drawn from proprietary report "Customer Dissatisfaction and Defection" from www.eComplaints.com
3 Data cited in Nero and Black (1998) was analyzed to determine 40% of passengers at the U.S.'s top 30 airports
connected. In hubs, this was 55% and 19% in non-hubs. The top 30 airports represented 2/3 of enplanements.
Assuming 19% of passengers connected in the airports outside of the top 30 (since they are not hubs), we estimate
33% of passengers connect on average.
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that consumers complain more about the airline industry than any other industry by a factor of
more than three.
Number of Complaints by Category
Jan 1, 1996 - Mar 30, 2001 on Ecomplaints.com
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Figure 2. Complaints to www.eComplaints.com by industry
2.2. Measurement of Airline Customer Satisfaction
The American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI), a publicly available academic study
conducted by the University of Michigan Business school, is a "national economic indicator of
customer satisfaction with the quality of goods and services available to household consumers in
the United States."4 Satisfaction scores for firms and industries are updated periodically and
distributed.
Scores in the American Customer Satisfaction Index are on a 100-point scale. The ACSI
is a series of simultaneous equations that tie customers' evaluations of quality and value to
satisfaction. It then explains the effects of satisfaction on customer complaints and customer
4 For more information, see http://www.bus.umich.edu/research/ngrc/acsi.html
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loyalty. The model ultimately estimates the percent of customers who will use each company
again on the next purchase occasion. The research in ACSI demonstrates that customer
satisfaction is significantly related to financial returns. For example, in the most recent year of
analysis, firms with the top 50% of ACSI scores generated an average $24 billion in shareholder
wealth while firms with the bottom 50% of scores created only $14 billion.
ACSI measures satisfaction with 164 companies and 30 government agencies. The U.S.-
owned companies produce about 40% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Additionally,
ACSI includes customer evaluations of foreign-owned companies with large market shares in a
number of the industries, and an aggregate satisfaction index for smaller and emerging
companies in each industry.
Customer Satisfaction Over Time: Overall Economy vs.
Airlines
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Figure 3. American Customer Satisfaction Index for Airline Industry over Time
ACSI data on the airline sector measures seven carriers: Southwest, Continental,
American, Delta, USAir, United and Northwest. The data in the figure above shows that the
airline customer satisfaction index has declined over the past five years since the study began.
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Additionally, the airlines are the lowest rated industry among the thirty sectors that the ACSI
examines.
2.3. Media Coverage
One may argue that the media coverage an issue receives serves as an indication of the
level of public interest into the topic. If that is the case, then the fact that media attention to
issues of airline customers has grown 13% annually in the past decade is indicative of a steady
and significant rise in public interest. To gauge the level of media interest in the airline industry,
we measured the percentage of days that USA Today and the New York Times, two nationally
read newspapers, published stories on the airline industry. This data was compiled by searching
within these publications in Lexis-Nexis for articles that discuss airline customers. The data is
shown in the charts below.
Percentage of Days in the New York Times Articles
Discuss AIRLINE CUSTOMERS
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Figure 4. Percent of Days New York Times
Percentage of Days In USA Today Articles Discuss
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USA Today was selected as a publication for analysis because it is the most widely read
publication by business travelers. It is also the news publication with the largest circulation. The
New York Times was selected because of its reputation as one of the most trusted and respected
news sources in the United States.
2.4. Government Attention
It is not surprising that with the recent growth of customer complaints and media
coverage of airline customer dissatisfaction, government regulators have focused attention on the
issue of airline service quality. Government focus on this problem was stimulated in January
1999 after the now infamous "Detroit Snowstorm." During this event, thousands of customers
were trapped on Northwest Airlines aircraft inbound to Detroit for up to eight hours.
As a result of the attention motivated by the Detroit Snowstorm, Congress threatened the
airlines with a "Passenger Bill of Rights" legislation. The major airlines responded with a form
of self-regulation by introducing Customer First plans. Fourteen major U.S. airline worked with
the Air Transport Association (ATA) 5 to develop these twelve-step customer service plans. ATA
worked with the carriers to build the basic steps of the plans and then each carrier individually
designed their own specific plans. Since the development of these plans, the Department of
Transportation has assessed the airlines' implementation and is proposing further legislation to
improve customer service.
5 The Air Transport Association (ATA) is the trade association for America's leading air carriers. Its members
transport over 95 percent of all the passenger and cargo traffic in the United States.
Page 17
2.4.1. The Detroit Snowstorm of January 1999
In the first few days of 1999, a major snowstorm overtook the Midwest, and Detroit's
Metro Wayne County Airport was significantly impacted. With all gates occupied with aircraft
or taxiways not clear, a number of Northwest Airlines aircraft landed in Detroit and remained on
the tarmac for up to eight hours waiting for gate space to open up. The situation received
extensive media attention and became the "poster-child" for airline service improvements.
Both Northwest Airlines and the FAA have studied the event thoroughly since that time.
Northwest's then Vice President for Customer Service and Operations, Robert Ball, describes the
events in the following way:
"Detroit was bombarded by the worst storm in 25 years, with schools closed for 2 weeks. The airport could not
clear runways fast enough to keep up with the arriving aircraft, and additional crews could not reach the airport
because Detroit did not plow its side streets. Also, travel on Interstate 94 near the airport slowed to the point
where it required ninety minutes to move just a few miles. In Systems Operations Control (SOC) for Northwest
in Minneapolis, personnel did not fully realize the magnitude of the ground situation in Detroit, and it was too
aggressive in allowing flights to arrive into Detroit. In addition, the storm was large enough that it prevented
diversion of aircraft to other Midwestern airports.
Most gates at Detroit Metro Airport already had aircraft, and a wave of Northwest aircraft landed and had
nowhere to go. These aircraft waited on taxiways and holding areas for gate space to open up. Severe weather
conditions hampered efforts to return aircraft to available gates or get passengers to terminal areas. In some
cases, aircraft were even frozen to the ground or parked on snow-lined taxiways that were unreachable." (Ott
1999)
In the following days, Northwest mailed letters to passengers who were trapped for two
hours or more and offered to cover expenses and to reimburse for losses on a case-by-case basis.
Northwest assigned one its senior executives, Ray Vecci, former Alaska Airlines president, to a
newly created management post at Detroit. About 7,000 of the trapped passengers sued
Northwest Airlines. Lawsuits alleged false imprisonment, negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress and breach of contract. Earlier this year, Northwest Airlines settled with the
passengers in the lawsuit for just over $7 million.
As a result of this event, government attention to airline customer service increased
dramatically. For a number of months, Congress discussed introducing a Passenger Bill of
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Rights for air travelers. A number of congressional airline-reform bills were put forward. In
March 1999, Vice President Gore unveiled an Airline Passenger Bill of Rights trying to tie
together the various bills already proposed. Eventually two key bills rose to the forefront: a
Senate bill, sponsored by Senators John McCain and Ron Wyden and a House bill, put forward
by Representative Bud Shuster, chairman of the House Aviation Committee. Both required
companies to compensate passengers if an airline error forces them to wait more than two hours
on the runway.
The issue of airline customer service quickly turned into a major lobbying and political
game. The larger question between airlines and FAA over who is to blame for issues of air
traffic congestion and ultimately traveler dissatisfaction was brought forward by the airlines.
The airlines successfully turned the question of airline customer service into a question of why
the FAA has been unable to modernize the air traffic control system.6
Surprisingly, some customer advocacy groups aligned with the airlines and the Air
Transport Association against regulation. They cited the complexity of the airline industry and
the danger that fares could increase if there was too much government intervention in the details
of the industry. The American Society of Travel Agents, upset over decreases in the past few
years of travel agent commissions, portrayed themselves as defenders of consumer rights and
aligned with the regulators (McKenna 1999).
Ultimately the airlines effectively lobbied Congress to allow them to develop a voluntary
customer service improvement plan. Proponents of the Congressional bills denounced the airline
service plans as the airlines promising what they are supposed to delivery anyway. Consumer
advocacy groups pointed to the $3 million lobbying effort and $1.3 million in political donations
6 Assertion made during lecture at MIT by James McKenna, former editor of Aviation Week and Space Technology
and current President of the Aviation Safety Alliance
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by the airline industry. Northwest Airlines, for example, spent $1.3 million on lobbying during
the first half of 1999.
2.4.2. Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century
On April 5, 2000, Congress enacted the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and
Reform Act for the 21st Century, also known as AIR-21. The act addressed a multitude of issues
in aviation:
m Airport and airway improvements
" Airline service improvements
- FAA management reform
m Family assistance in air disasters
- Safety
= Transfer of aeronautical charting activity
m National parks air tour management
m Federal aviation research, engineering and development
- Extension of airport and airway trust fund expenditure authority
One section of the act specifically addressed issues of immediate relevance to airline customers.
There were three sections in this area: airline service to small communities, airline customer
service and airline competition. The contents of the Airline Customer Service section included
the following:
- Consumer notification of E-ticket expiration dates.
m Increased penalty for violation of aviation consumer protection laws.
- Funding of over $2 million annually until 2006 for the enforcement of airline
consumer protections.
- Airline customer service reports.
o Member airlines of the Air Transport Association (ATA) shall provide an
individual customer service plan by September 15, 1999, based on the ATA
plan put forward on June 17, 1999
o The Department of Transportation Inspector General shall monitor the success
of the airlines in implementing their plans. The report shall include a status
report on completion, publication, and implementation of the Airline
Customer Service Commitment and the individual air carrier's plans to carry
it out. The report shall also include a review of whether each air carrier
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described in subsection (a) has modified its contract of carriage or conditions
of contract to reflect each item of the Airline Customer Service Commitment.
- Increased financial responsibility for lost baggage.
m Comptroller General investigation on the potential effects on aviation consumers,
including the impact on fares and service to small communities, of a requirement that
air carriers permit a ticketed passenger to use any portion of a multiple-stop or round-
trip air fare for transportation independent of any other portion without penalty.
m Airline service quality performance reports to disclose more fully to the public the
nature and source of delays and cancellations experienced by air travelers.
" National commission to ensure consumer information and choice in the airline
industry to study travel agent industry and assess status.
2.4.3. Airline Customer First Plans
The airline Customer First plans were developed after the airline industry lobbied
Congress against a Passenger Bill of Rights. As Carol Hallett, President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Air Transport Association of America, said, the plans were the "direct result of
[the Senate Transportation] Committee's concerns about the level of customer service in the
airline industry. [The airlines] appreciate the fact that the Committee has given us an
opportunity to address this issue without the intervention of federal rules and inflexible
regulations." (Hallett 2001) The threat of regulation prompted airline executives to address
issues the government finds important, but those executives much preferred to address the issues
themselves than be told by the government how to address them. The Customer First plans were
the airline self-regulation response to the government's concerns of passenger service.
The Customer First plans promise to:
1) Offer the lowest fare available
2) Notify customers of known delays, cancellations and diversions: establish and implement
policies for accommodating passengers delayed overnight. Make clear and concise statement
of airlines' policies in these respects available to customers.
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3) On-time baggage delivery: make every reasonable effort to return checked bags within 24
hours and attempt to contact any customer whose unclaimed, checked luggage contains a
name and address or telephone number.
4) Support an increase in the baggage liability limit: the airlines have successfully petitioned the
Department of Transportation for this.
5) Allow reservations to be held or canceled: allow the customer either to hold a telephone
reservation without payment for 24 hours or (at the election of the carrier) to cancel a
reservation without penalty for up to 24 hours, in order to give customers an opportunity to
check for lower fares through other distribution systems.
6) Provide prompt ticket refunds: issue refunds for eligible tickets within 7 days for credit card
purchases and 20 days for cash purchases.
7) Properly accommodate disabled and special needs passengers: disclose policies and
procedures.
8) Meet customers' essential needs during long on-aircraft delays: make every reasonable effort
to provide food, water, restroom facilities and access to medical treatment for passengers
aboard an aircraft that is on the ground for an extended period of time without access to the
terminal. Prepare contingency plans to address such circumstances and work with other
carriers and the airport to share facilities and make gates available in an emergency.
9) Handle "bumped" passengers with fairness and consistency: disclose to a passenger, upon
request, whether the flight on which the passenger is ticketed is overbooked. Establish and
disclose to the customer policies and procedures for managing the inability to board all
passengers with confirmed reservations.
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10) Disclose travel itinerary, cancellation policies, frequent flyer rules and aircraft configuration
to the customer: (i) any change of aircraft on a single flight with the same flight number; (ii)
cancellation policies involving failures to use each flight segment coupon; (iii) rules,
restrictions and an annual report on frequent flyer program redemptions; and (iv) upon
request, information regarding aircraft configuration, including seat size and pitch
11) Ensure good customer service from code-share partners.
12) Be more responsive to customer complaints: assign a Customer Service Representative
responsible for handling passenger complaints and ensuring that all written complaints are
responded to within 60 days. Publish and make available their Customer Service Plans: (i)
on airline Internet Web sites; (ii) at airports and ticket offices (upon request); and, (iii) to
travel and reservation agents.
2.4.4. Airline Initiatives in Customer Service
Beyond the Customer First plans, individual airlines have undertaken a number of
initiatives to improve upon customer service. The greatest effort put forth by the airlines has
been with technology solutions to deal with customer processing. Numerous airlines have
introduced self check-in facilities for customers. With these machines, customers swipe a credit
card to identify themselves. The machine communicates with the reservation system, identifies
the passenger and ultimately prints the customer a boarding pass. The machines are most
prevalent in a carrier's hub airports. The leaders on this front have been Northwest Airlines and
Continental Airlines. The two airlines work together on a number of issues, and they have tied
their self check-in facilities together. So, in Continental Airlines' Cleveland hub, a Northwest
Airlines passenger can use the many Continental self check-in machines. Similarly, in
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Northwest's Detroit hub, a Continental passenger can use the many Northwest self check-in
machines.
Other technology solutions include use of voice recognition technology to reduce wait
times for passenger calling on the phone. Some carriers have introduced portable rebooking
hotlines. This is a portable cart with a bank of phones that can be wheeled out to a gate that has
a flight experiencing a long delay or cancellation. The passengers calling on the Rebooking
hotline are automatically given priority status to the reservation operators.
Some carriers have taken a management approach to improving customer service.
Northwest Airlines, America West Airlines and US Airways have introduced a new vice
president level management position to their management structure focusing on customer
service. By having a senior manager within the company focus specifically on issues of
customer service, these carriers believe that they will always maintain the appropriate level of
attention on customer service. In addition, a number of airlines have offered extensive customer
service training to its personnel that interact with the customer, like ground operations and flight
attendants.
Some carriers have actively addressed the physical comfort for the customer. Notably,
American Airlines removed two rows of seats on every one of its aircraft to increase the legroom
and ultimately improve the on-board comfort of all passengers. American's move might be
considered a reaction to United Airlines' decision to introduce an additional class of service,
called Economy Plus. This class is generally among the first few rows of the economy cabin and
offers improved legroom to the passenger. In addition to legroom, carriers have improved the
amenities offered to customers, especially during irregular operations. Most carriers have
developed standard kits that can be handed out during extensive delays. These often include a
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phone card of a few minutes to make a call home and a snack to tide over the passenger's
hunger.
Airlines have actively dealt with managing luggage needs of customers. Continental
Airlines, for example, has installed new overhead luggage bins in its aircraft that are significantly
larger their previous bins. This offers a competitive advantage over other carriers and decreases
the chances of a customer having to gate-check a carry-on bag. In addition, Northwest Airlines
was the first airline to offer discount vouchers for future air travel in response to lost luggage
situations.
2.4.5. D.O.T. Inspector General Report on Airline Customer Service
As discussed above, the AIR-21 legislation of April 2000 included provisions on airline
customer service. Congress accepted the airlines' self-regulation as a first step towards
improvement in airline customer service, but in AIR-21, the Department of Transportation
Inspector General was tasked with assessing the success of implementation of the plans within
one year. In February 2001, the Inspector General issued a full report on the implementation of
the customer service plans. In a hearing in front of the Senate Subcommittee on Commerce,
D.O.T. Inspector General Kenneth Mead discussed the results of the investigation. His
comments and the report are summarized below.
The investigation was conducted between November 1, 1999 and January 17, 2001. In
that time, the Inspector General's office examined operations of 14 ATA airlines and 3 non-ATA
airlines (AirTran Airways, Frontier Airlines and National Airlines). The study looked at 39
airports, 550 delayed flights, 160 canceled flights, 4,100 claims for mishandled baggage and over
2,000 telephone calls to reservation centers.
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The report found that in a number of areas, the airlines met the appropriate level of
service. Specifically, they discovered that airlines met their promises in the following areas:
" Quoting lowest fare
m Holding nonrefundable reservations
" Timely response to complaints
- Higher pay-outs for lost baggage
" Provisions for disabled and special needs passengers
" Providing prompt ticket refunds
With regards to flight delays and cancellations, the Inspector General found the greatest
need for improvement. They discovered that in over 20 percent of observed flights, the flight
information display system showed the flight on time when it was actually delayed more than 20
minutes. In meeting customers' essential needs during long delays, airlines differed in what
qualified as an "extended" delay. For some it was 45 minutes, for others it was 3 hours. The
first recommendation of the Inspector General was for airlines to develop targets for reducing the
number of chronically delayed flights.7 They also suggested a system be put in place that
contacts passengers early when a known, lengthy flight delay exists. They said the airlines
should ensure delay information is updated on monitors and that airline employees make timely
announcements about the status of the delay. Finally, in this regards, they felt the airlines should
clarify the customers' rights when put into an overnight situation due to delays.
The Inspector General noted that the issue of delay and cancellation raises the topic of
airport and air traffic control infrastructure. The report reiterates three recommendations made to
the Secretary of Transportation in the past year on this topic. The first recommendation was to
implement a uniform system for tracking delays, cancellations and their causes. The second was
to develop capacity benchmarks at the nation's top 30 airports to understand implications of
scheduling practices. Finally, the third recommendation was to develop a strategic plan for
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addressing capacity shortfalls in the immediate (2 year), intermediate (5 year) and long term (10
years).
For luggage, airlines committed to make every reasonable effort to return mishandled
checked bags within 24 hours. The DOT currently reports the number of baggage claim reports
per 1000 enplaned passengers on domestic flights. The report suggests altering this metric to
report the number of actual bags lost per 1000 checked bags. The Inspector General
recommends that airlines set performance goals for reducing the number of mishandled bags and
track the amount of time it takes to deliver lost bags. He suggests that all airlines provide a toll-
free telephone number for passengers to check on the status of their lost bags.
On the subject of denied boardings in the case of overbooked flights, the Inspector
General also found a need for improvement. He suggests that airlines establish a uniform check-
in deadline and that all carriers disclose their policies on check-in deadlines in both their
contracts of carriage and on ticket jackets. The airlines need to ensure all volunteers on the same
flight are compensated equally and that the compensation to involuntarily bumped passengers be
increased. Overall, the Inspector General wanted to ensure that airlines conduct bumping
practices in a manner that is fair and consistent.
The report recommends airlines disclose the flight's on-time performance in the previous
month without the customer asking. Currently the airlines only disclose on-time performance
when the customer requests the information. The report believes airlines should notify the
passenger of this information without being asked. He suggests that a report of chronically
delayed flights be included in the monthly Air Travel Consumer Report.
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7 The Inspector General's report defined chronically delayed flights as those that are late 30 minutes over 40% of the
time
Though the airlines promise improvements in customer service, these provisions are not
always legally enforceable by customers unless they are incorporated into the airline's contract
of carriage. Three of the 14 airlines in the study incorporated the entire text of their plans into
their contracts of carriage. The other eleven incorporated parts, but not all, of the plans into their
contracts of carriage. The report recommended making the entire airline customer service
commitment enforceable under the contract of carriage.
The report suggested that airlines improve the information they provide to customers on
frequent flyer programs. The Inspector General suggests providing the percentage of successful
redemptions and frequent flyer seats available in the airline's top origin and destination markets
in the airline's annual report.
The Department of Transportation is responsible for oversight and enforcement of
consumer protection and unfair competition in the airline industry. The Inspector General found
that the resources available to the D.O.T. are seriously inadequate to deal with the problem.
They recommended a significant increase in the resources allocated to the Department of
Transportation division responsible for consumer protection and a corresponding increase in
examination of the laws protecting air travelers.
The Inspector General report recommended adding a commitment under which the
airlines would establish quality assurance and performance measurement systems. They
suggested the airlines conduct periodic internal audits of these metrics and provide access to the
data to the Department of Transportation for review.
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2.4.6. Airline Customer Service Improvement Act (S.319)
As of March, 2001, the Senate Subcommittee on Commerce is developing the Airline Customer
Service Improvement Act, also known as S.319. The content of this act follow directly from the
Inspector General's report of February, 2001. The components of S.319 are summarized in the
table on the next page.
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Table 3. Summary of S.319
* Ensure airlines incorporate customer service commitment into their contracts of carriage
e Customer Information
- Provide lowest fare available and inform lower fares may be available elsewhere
- Inform on cause of delays along with best estimate of departure time
- Provide on-time performance information on airline website
- Disclose on-time performance during purchase process
- Provide information on plan for overnight passengers
- Inform of compensation for passengers involuntarily denied boarding
* Bumping Practices
- Uniform check-in deadline across carriers
- Standardize compensation
- Ensure fairness and consistency in who gets bumped
* Other service issues
- Ensure flight information displays are up-to-date
- Establish targets for chronically delayed flights
- Establish system for passengers to find out if long delay exists ahead of flight
- Define what constitute an "extended" delay or "emergency" situation
- Monitor service to disabled and special needs passengers
- Ensure airline development of passenger service contingency plans
- Performance targets for mishandled baggage
- System for tracking time to get mishandled baggage to passenger
- Provide toll free number for tracking mishandled baggage
- Annual audit of service provided by code-share partners
- Report of frequent flyer point redemption data in annual report
* Improving Statistics for Service Measurement
- Improved mishandled baggage metric
- Include chronic delayed flights in Air Travel Consumer Report
* Increase resources to the D.O.T. airline passenger consumer protection division
* Ensuring Airline Compliance
- Establish customer service quality assurance and performance measurement system
- Airlines conduct internal audit
- Airlines permit DOT to audit this information periodically
- Secretary of DOT responsible for ensuring compliance
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2.4.7. Airline Response to DOT Inspector General's Report & S.319
Since Congress reviewed the DOT Inspector General's report and proposed the S.319
regulation, the airlines and ATA announced a second round of self-regulatory actions. The
actions are discussed below and follow directly from the report and S.319.
First, the airlines announced they are in the process of placing the twelve components of
the Customer First plans into their contracts of carriage. They are establishing internal
performance measurement systems and audit procedures to comply with their respective plans.
These internal systems will be open to scrutiny and review by the Department of Transportation.
Systems will be developed so that passengers can determine if their flights are on time, delayed
or cancelled prior to departing for the airport. Airlines made a commitment to ensure passengers
with special needs and disabilities receive the necessary attention and focus. They also ensured
customers that they will always be informed of the lowest fare displayed on their airline
telephone reservation systems.
Regarding chronically delayed flights, Carol Hallett said, "As we hope the public will
understand, airlines simply do not have control over all of the multiple causes that lead to delays
and cancellations. However, we are doing what we can to be part of the solution." (Hallett 2001)
The airlines accepted the challenge of reducing chronically delayed or cancelled flights for
factors within its control.
On a couple issues, the airlines said they will petition the Department of Transportation
to initiate rulemaking. Regarding involuntary denied boarding compensation, the airlines will
ask the DOT to issue a rule in this matter. To better understand the number of mishandled bags,
the airlines will petition the DOT to review the issue as well.
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Finally, the airlines announced a two-part, coordinated effort to improve customer
service. First, they will form a task force between the airlines, airport and FAA to review and
make recommendations that will help ensure airport display monitors and other information
customers receive are accurate and timely. Second, they said they would work closely with
airport management to plan for passengers remaining overnight due to delays or cancellations.
2.4.8. Other issues under government scrutiny: congestion and competition
Currently Receiving
Government Attention
Airline
Customer
Dissatisfaction
Figure 5. Relationship between Multiple Issues of Government Focus in Airline Industry
In addition to airline customer service, two other major issues in the airline industry are
receiving extensive government attention. These are airline competition and system congestion.
As the framework above shows, airline service quality is one of a number of potential causes of
airline customer dissatisfaction. Both competition and congestion could be underlying factors
that actually impact the level of customer dissatisfaction. For example, lack of competition,
especially in a major network carrier's hub, may allow the carrier to be less concerned about
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service quality. After all, the customer may not have many options to turn to instead of the
network hub carrier. Also, because of congestion, customers may experience extensive delays
that are not the carrier's fault but heavily impact the level of dissatisfaction with the experience.
It is important for Congress to understand the relationship between competition, congestion and
service quality, and their impacts on customer dissatisfaction before passing extensive
regulation. Tweaking the airlines' service delivery may even be unnecessary with increases in
competition and improvements in congestion.
In March of 2001, a bill entitled the Aviation Competition Restoration Act (S.415) was
proposed in the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation. Motivation for
the bill lies in the fact that the airline system is dominated by a few large air carriers and that it
potentially may become even more concentrated. Many believe that continued consolidation
will have negative impacts on customer service and result in higher fares. The bill S.415 is
designed to allow competitive access to gates, facilities and other assets at airports. Currently
start-up low-cost carriers have difficulty gaining access to the nation's busiest airports. The
barriers lie either in access to gates or access to slots. S.415 will ensure the Secretary of
Transportation monitors use of gate space at the busiest airports and that low-cost carriers have
access to available resources.
The issue of congestion receives the most attention by the government relative to all other
issues of aviation. Most recently the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation
held a hearing in May, 2001, regarding delays due to air traffic control. Testimony was offered
by Federal Aviation Administration Administrator Jane Garvey along with leaders from industry.
The FAA has undertaken a number of near-term steps to reduce congestion, such as opening
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additional sectors or developing new air traffic routes through the most congested East coast
points in the system.
In addition to the short-term solutions, the FAA is working with the airline industry to
develop a ten year National Airspace System Operational Evolution Plan (OEP). This involved a
coordinated effort within the FAA and systematic collaboration with the airlines, airports, and
other members of the aviation community. It is the first time the FAA is conducting such work
so closely with the industry and represents a new shift in the group's approach. Specifically, the
OEP calls for 1) Expanding implementation of area navigation (RNAV) procedures; 2)
Completing the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) of satellite-based navigation; 3)
Introducing datalink to reduce voice communications between pilots and controllers, and 4)
Reducing vertical separation of aircraft at high altitudes from 2,000 feet to 1,000 feet. The plan
lays out specific tasks to be accomplished in the near-term (2001 and 2002), mid-term (2002 to
2004) and long term (2005 to 2010).
2.5. Airline Interest in Customer Satisfaction
2.5.1. Threat of government regulation
The airline industry has its own motivations for understanding and maintaining good
customer service. Ironically, the threat of government regulation may be the greatest motivation
for paying attention to this issue. Airline managers have frequently stated their desire for
Congress to not get involved in details of operating the airline industry. Their belief lies in the
fact that the airlines are an extremely complex business to run, and what may appear to be small
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changes on the surface to Congress could have dramatic impacts on managing an airline with a
large network.i
Airline managers point to the recent experience with Congress and LaGuardia airport to
further make their point. As part of the AIR-21 legislation, Congress made slot control at
LaGuardia airport more lenient. Specifically, an exemption was granted to any airline using
Stage 3 aircraft with less than 71 seats that proposed nonstop service between LaGuardia and an
airport that was designated a small hub or nonhub in 1997. The exemption was granted if either
the airline was not providing such nonstop service during the week of November 1, 1999, if
proposed service exceeded the number of flights provided during that week in 1999 or if the
transportation provided a regional jet as a replacement of turboprop service.
There was a significant growth in the number of exempted operations: 53 in August 2000
and 192 in September 2000. There were 9,000 flight delays at LaGuardia in September 2000, up
from 3,108 in September, 1999. In September 2000, 25% of flight delays in the U.S. were at
LaGuardia. In September 1999, it was 12%. Average delays for many afternoon flights at
LaGuardia in September 2000 exceeded 48 minutes. The average delays for all flights that
month was 43 minutes. LaGuardia experienced as many as 600 delayed flights on days when
there was good weather and no other significant problems existed in the ATC system. After
AIR-21 was enacted on April 5, 2000, carriers filed exemption requests for more than 600 new
flights a day at LaGuardia. As of November 1, almost 300 new flights were operating under
AIR-21. At that time, 28 more were scheduled for December and 23 more for January. In April
2000, the number of scheduled operations at LaGuardia was 1064, and in November it was 1344.
8 Result drawn from speakers at M.I.T. and visits made by MIT Global Airline Industry study participants to major
airlines around the world
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Thus, what appeared to a body like Congress as a small tweak to the system had a
completely unanticipated ripple effects in a system as complex as the national airspace system.
Airline managers believe that regulation from Congress will only serve to disrupt the industry
and decrease the quality of operations performance.
2.5.2. Relationship between customer satisfaction and financial performance
There is extensive marketing literature that studies the relationship between customer
satisfaction and a firm's financial performance. Studies show customer satisfaction positively
impacts a firm's financial performance. Major airlines are publicly held, and management is
responsible for generating shareholder value. One would expect airline managers to be
concerned about satisfaction since it could impact financial performance. Of course, customer
satisfaction and profitability are not necessarily positively correlated. Improving customer
satisfaction has costs, and it is conceivable that these may not be covered by increased revenue
from more satisfied customers.
Some of the standard results in this field are the following:
" Customer satisfaction shown to relate positively to repurchase intentions (Bearden & Teal,
1983; Oliver 1988)
" Perceived service encounter satisfaction and perceived service quality positively related to
behavioral intentions (Cronin & Taylor, 1992)
" Customer satisfaction positively related to purchase intention and behavior (LaBarbera &
Mazursky, 1983)
Page 36
In the airline industry, two studies have attempted to examine the relationship between
customer satisfaction and airline financial performance. Dresner and Xu (1995) examined the
following research questions:
m What effects do three customer service variables - on-time performance, mishandled
baggage and ticket oversales - have on the level of customer satisfaction, as measured by
the number of customer complaints to the U.S. DOT?
- What effect do customer service and customer satisfaction have on corporate profitability
in the airline industry?
They studied thirteen major U.S. airlines from 1Q 1998 to 4Q 1990 - a total of 150 observations.
They modeled profitability as a function of complaints, on-time performance, oversales,
mishandled baggage and a number of control variables (carrier, time).
The results demonstrated that reduced on-time performance, increased oversales and
increased baggage mishandling were all significantly correlated to an increase in customer
complaints. It was shown that the volume of customer complaints had a negative impact on
profitability ratios. In other words, the greater the number of complaints, the lower the financial
performance. If one assumes the number of complaints is a proxy for the level of customer
dissatisfaction, one can conclude a relationship exists between improved customer satisfaction
and improved financial performance in the airline industry.
There are a number of limitations to this study. First, it does not factor hub premiums
among its control variables. One also needs to assume DOT customer complaint data is a
relevant model of customer satisfaction in the U.S. airline industry. In addition, the level of
congestion is not considered as a control on the level of satisfaction. While the study
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demonstrates the positive relationship between airline customer service and financial
performance might exist, it is by no means given.
More recently, Behn and Riley (1999) conducted a similar study with a similar set of
data. The questions involved in their study were the following:
m What is the association between nonfinancial information and financial performance in
the U.S. domestic airline industry?
m Can nonfinancial data be useful in predicting future financial performance?
They studied six major U.S. airlines between 1988 and 1996 (Alaska, American, America West,
Delta, Southwest and United) for a total of 213 quarterly observations. They developed models
of financial variables (operating revenue, operating profit and operating costs) as a function of
complaints and a number of controlling factors (load factor, market share, ASMs, time and
carrier).
The results of Behn and Riley's are similar to those of Dresner and Xu. They find for the
operating income model that increased complaints is correlated to decreased income. They find
that increased complaints correlates to decreased revenue. Finally, increased complaints is
related to increased costs. The authors state a key limitation to their study is the incorporation of
all relevant controlling factors. Those they suggest should be included in future work include
geographic coverage, hub concentration, haul length and frequent flyer membership.
Some observers of the airlines suggest dominant hub carriers do not have incentive to focus on
airline customer service because of little competition in their hubs. Numerous studies have
demonstrated the market power airlines have in hubs via a competitive advantage with
frequencies, bureaucratic control with airport authorities, travel agent commissions and captive
frequent flyers [see Borenstein (1989) and Berry (1990)]. This is why it is important that any
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analysis of the customer satisfaction-financial performance relationship should factor in the role
hubs play in airline financial performance.
In fact one noted expert on customer satisfaction, Claes Fornell of the University of
Michigan, expresses a strong viewpoint in this regards. He states:
"[T]he reason that customer satisfaction might not be a primary concern for many of the airlines is that
there are limited financial penalties that passengers can impose on an unresponsive company. In any buyer-
seller relationship, the power of the former hinges on the availability of alternatives. Airline choice is
restricted because many airports are dominated by one of the carriers. Whenever competition is limited,
customer satisfaction typically suffers, since dissatisfied customers cannot stop buying or take their
business elsewhere. In other words, except for airlines that face genuine competition on a majority of their
routes, profits and customer satisfaction do not necessarily go hand in hand." (Fornell 2000)
If Fornell's hypothesis is correct, public policy makers may be more inclined to examine the
determinants of service quality in the airline industry. It is important to note that Fornell makes
this statement from more of a theoretical and anecdotal perspective as opposed to from the
perspective of detailed analysis.
The airline industry would be well served to examine the issue of the dynamic between
customer satisfaction and financial performance in great detail. This topic is prevalent in the
public examination of the industry and has not been studied fully to date.
2.5.3. Changing Airline Industry Structure
The airline industry worldwide is currently in the midst of an evolution in industry
structure. Large airlines understand that the size of one's network is a critical competitive
advantage as a network carrier. The result of this has been increased consolidation of U.S.
carriers domestically and partnership among major airlines worldwide. While the proposed
merger between United Airlines and U.S. Airways fell through, the attempted consolidation is
indicative of the importance of network size. American Airlines and TWA merged recently, and
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there may be new wave of mergers in the next few years with a more business friendly
government in power.
Internationally we have seen the emergence of global alliances in the past three years.
There are four major alliance groups to speak of: the Star Alliance led by United Airlines and
Lufthansa German Airlines, oneworld led by British Airways and American Airlines, Wings led
by Northwest Airlines and KLM Dutch Airways and SkyTeam led by Air France and Delta
Airlines. While these airlines are the leaders, three of the four global alliances include a number
of other carriers to fill in the global network. For example, the Star Alliance is the largest
alliance and has 14 carriers in total.
With so many airlines cooperating together, airline managers must understand customer
needs along the "seams of coordination" between cooperating airlines. A seam is defined as a
component of customer service delivery that involves active participation from both cooperating
airlines. For example, if a customer is traveling across multiple alliance partners on a trip,
transfer of their checked luggage is one seam of coordination. For the passenger's luggage to
arrive to his or her destination on time, both airlines must work together to transfer luggage onto
their own aircraft and then transfer luggage between each other.
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Chapter 3. Existing Knowledge on Airline Customer Service
Within academic literature, there are relatively few studies that focus on airline customer
issues. Typically, papers that study airline customers address customers in the context of a
separate issue with airlines selected as an industry for empirical analysis. No studies to date
have focused on airline customers for the purpose of studying airline customers. The airlines
have extensive public data and is an industry that is easy to understand.9 That is why academics
often utilize the airlines as an industry of application for empirical analysis.
Typically academics have examined a subset of the airline customer experience. Specific
components, such as the on-board experience or passenger perception of delays, have been
studied. However, there have been no studies holistically examining the complete airline
experience. In this chapter, a review of what is known from previous research about the airline
customer experience is presented.
3.1. Key Studies on Components of the Airline Customer Experience
A study by Ostrowski, O'Brien and Gordon (1993) examined the relationship between
service quality and customer loyalty in the airline industry. The authors felt that a number of
service quality studies to that point in time focused on generalized findings across service
industries but spent less effort on examining the role of service quality in specific industry
settings. They decided to study service quality in the airline industry.
Ostrowski et al surveyed passengers on fifteen specific individual issues associated with a
flight. Respondents also provided two global evaluations, one on quality and one on value. The
results of this study suggested that even in the early 1990's the quality of airline service was low
in the eyes of customers. The respondents were surveyed about two specific carriers considered
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to be benchmark carriers in the industry. For three of the fifteen items, over half the sample
assigned ratings of not very good or poor: personal space, arm and shoulder room and legroom.
For nine of the items, over 20% assigned ratings of not very good or poor: seating comfort, food
quality, amount of food, baggage delivery promptness, craft interior attractiveness and on-time
performance.
The authors used regression analysis to determine the relationship between self-expressed
customer loyalty and the quality of service on the fifteen dimensions studied. They found that
for one of the carriers, helpful check-in personnel, seating comfort, baggage delivery, craft
interior and value were significant variables. For the other carrier, they found that flight
attendants, food quality, on-time performance and overall value were significant. Unfortunately,
these results are only somewhat helpful to our study. The purpose of our research is to
understand what motivates customer dissatisfaction across the entire airline industry. We are not
as interested in knowing differences in drivers of dissatisfaction for specific airlines.
A paper by Soderlund and Gunnarsson (2000) examined the role of customer familiarity
with satisfaction and dissatisfaction and used the airlines as its industry for empirical analysis.
The research found that customers with a high level of familiarity with the provider and service
will have a lower level of satisfaction than low familiarity customers, given a high level of
performance. Individuals with a lower level of experience with air travel will often assess the
experience in a more polarized manner than those with more experience.
This result poses an interesting quandary to government and management leaders of the
airline industry. The airlines clearly want to maximize their share of the business traveler
segment. This customer segment travels frequently and pays the highest average fares.
According to Soderlund and Gunnarsson, one would expect business travelers to be harder to
9 DOT Customer Complaint data and Form 41 operating cost data are two excellent sources of historical airline data
Page 42
satisfy but also have lower expectations from the airline. Hence, airline management may keep
service levels to the minimum levels that meet the low expectations of high-fare business
travelers. Ironically for the airlines, their greatest service delivery challenge may be with
meeting the expectations of infrequent, low-fare leisure passengers. Anecdotal evidence from
airline executives suggest this segment makes up over half of the traffic, so it represents a
majority of the traveling population. Since this segment is expected to have more polarized
reactions to service, they may more actively drive public impression of customer dissatisfaction.
The airlines cater their service delivery to meet the needs and expectations of the high-fare
business traveler segment, but public impression of customer discontent may be more driven by
the low-fare infrequent leisure travelers.
A third key study was conducted by Taylor (1994) on the relationship between delays in
service and evaluation of the service experience. Taylor discusses how service delays can be
mitigated through operations management or perceptions management. Since no service
provider can ever deliver a perfect service, it is critical to understand the variables that influence
the perception of delay. The research conducted a survey on passengers on delayed airline
flights out of a large Western city. The results showed that delay significantly increased a
passenger's feeling of anger and uncertainty. The degree to which the airline was perceived to
have control over the delay increased customer anger. Also, the degree to which time was filled
during the delay mitigated uncertainty and anger.
The results demonstrate the importance of information to the airline customer. Service
evaluations were affected directly by the evaluation of uncertainty caused by the delay.
Interestingly, the customers' evaluation of punctuality was influenced more by the anger
passengers felt by the delay than by the delay duration itself. The punctuality evaluation is not
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necessarily a calculation for a specific time period but a more subjective evaluation of lateness.
This makes customer interactions with airline personnel even more critical to the ultimate
valuation of the service experience. If airline employees resist effectively answering questions
from customers regarding delays, this would be expected to negatively compound the customers'
perception of the delay. The service provider's perceived control of the delay can also
negatively impact the customer's anger over the delay. So, if the airline employees demonstrate
an uncaring attitude regarding the delay, this would result in a worse impression of the service
experience.
Taylor concludes that service providers should acknowledge the importance of
addressing uncertainty associated with delay. Taking actions to reduce these uncertainties
should affect the customer's ultimate evaluation of the service experience. Thus, providing
information to customers is critical to managing service disruptions.
3.2. Measuring Quality Factors Among Airline Customers, Managers and Government
Gourdin and Kloppenborg (1991) examined what various constituents in the airline
industry (passengers, management, government) felt constituted a quality service experience.
They sought to understand whether the interests of each of these three groups were in agreement
or in conflict.
At the time of their study, research on service industries was extensive. Proponents of
research on service industry pointed to three key distinctions about services relative to hard
goods. First, services are intangible. This makes testing them for quality a subjective as
opposed to objective exercise. Second, they are heterogeneous. In other words, the same
product can take on various manifestations over multiple service deliveries. Finally, production
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and consumption occur at the same time, so the consumer is an integral part of the process of
service delivery.
Gourdin and Kloppenborg focused on identifying the factors that must be accomplished
for quality air travel from three different viewpoints: passengers, airline managers and
government officials. Their results demonstrate significant differences in responses among the
three groups. In this research, focus is given to the results for the passenger group, since this is
the area of focus of this study. Unfortunately, Gourdin and Kloppenborg do not provide great
detail on the results of their study. However, the table below highlights what the passengers
found important. Clearly, the list is extensive and in some ways a complete depiction of the
airline customer experience.
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Table 4. Important Issues for Passengers According to Gourdin and Kloppenborg (1991)
Information
- Delayed flight status promptly provided
- Meaningful flight information promptly displayed
Comfort & Amenities
" Comfortable seat
- Enough knee and leg room
- Beverage service on long flights
- Aircraft clean inside
Baggage
- Prompt baggage delivery
- Careful baggage handling
" Lost bag procedure
Timing
- Convenient departure times
- Convenient arrival times
" Airline assumes responsibility for delayed passengers
" Take-off on time
- On-board comfort during delays
m Non-stop flights
Safety
" Preflight security screening
Price
- Lower fares for non-peak travel
Convenience
" Preassigned seating
- Convenient check-in
- Convenient connections
Be Heard
" Aircraft complaint mechanism
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3.3. Measuring Total Service Quality in the Airline Industry
An important study on airline industry service was conducted by Young, Cunningham
and Lee in 1994. This study is perhaps the most complete in terms of examining a full airline
customer experience. The study utilized the SERVQUAL methodology in understanding service
quality as a management tool for the airline industry.
SERVQUAL is a customer survey methodology developed by Parasuraman, Zeithaml
and Berry (1985, 1988, 1991). This trio of authors developed SERVQUAL through a series of
publications and publication debates starting in 1985. The theory of SERVQUAL rests on the
fact that customers' assessment of overall service quality is determined by the degree and
direction of the gap between their expectations and perceptions of actual performance level.
This is known as the expectation disconfirmation paradigm. The authors proposed this theory
for measuring service quality in their first publication in 1985 and followed up with publications
in 1988 and the early 1990's to operationalize this theory.
The SERVQUAL scale classifies service delivery attributes into five categories:
tangibles, reliability, responsiveness, assurance and empathy. A detailed description of these
categories and the measures SERVQUAL uses for each are included in the table below. The
survey asks the respondent to define what they expect for each service measure and follow with a
separate question about how well a certain service provider delivered the service. The gap
between expectation and actual service delivery is the SERVQUAL measure.
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Table 5. Measures in SERVQUAL
Tangibles
1) Up-to-date equipment
2) Physical facilities are visually appealing
3) Employees are well dressed and appear neat
4) The appearance of physical facilities is in keeping with the type of services provided
Reliability
5) When the company promises to do something by a certain time, it does so
6) When you have problems, the company is sympathetic and reassuring
7) The company is dependable
8) The company provides its services at the time it promises to do so.
9) The company keeps its records accurately
Responsiveness
10) The company does not tell customers exactly when services will be performed
11) You do not receive prompt service from the company
12) Employees of the company are not always willing to help customers
13) Employees of the company are too busy to respond to customer requests promptly
Assurance
14) You can trust employees of the company
15) You feel safe in your transactions with the company's employees
16) Employees are polite
17) Employees get adequate support to do their jobs well
Empathy
18) The company does not give you individual attention
19) Employees do not give you personal attention
20) Employees do not know what your needs are
21) The company does not have your best interest at heart
22) The company does not have operating hours convenient to all their customers
SERVQUAL has fostered extensive debate in the service quality literature. One concern
has been whether one needs to calculate a difference between expectation and delivery to
understand the level of service quality from a service provider. A study by Cronin and Taylor
(1992) compared SERVQUAL to the information derived from directly asking respondents how
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well a service provider deliver service relative to expectations.10 Cronin and Taylor found that
the two methodologies provided similar information and results. However, the direct method
requires half as many questions as SERVQUAL. They suggested asking the questions directly
and not utilize the two-step approach.
Another issue with SERVQUAL is the lack of information about the importance of each
attribute. There may be a large gap between expectation and delivery of an attribute, but a
service provider may not need be concerned if the attribute is not important to the customers'
satisfaction or choice process. Simply examining the gaps from SERVQUAL may provide an
incomplete picture.
Young et al applied SERVQUAL to the domestic airline industry hoping to develop
accurate measures of service quality in response to the evolving importance of service
competition in the United States. The study tested the effectiveness of SERVQUAL measures
along with metrics from the Air Travel Consumer Report (ATCR). The ATCR was pushed
through by Congress in the late 1980's in response to decreasing airline service levels resulting
from problems with merger integration. The intent was to provide a report to the traveling public
on negative service experiences to inform airline choice. Young et al believe it is an ineffective
tool due to its lack of dissemination and no testing of the accuracy of the data. The DOT claims
that corporate travel managers use the information and that the media effectively communicates
the information to the traveling public.
Young et al point out other key problems with the ATCR. On-time performance, for
example, is based on the time at which the aircraft pushes back from its gate. A flight may sit on
the tarmac for two hours but still have an on-time departure if it pushed back in a timely fashion.
10 For example, the respondent may be asked directly in one question to rate how well a service provider delivered
against their expectations
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Carriers have the opportunity to game the system and improve their statistics. Also, data quality
is questioned at times in the FAA's report on system delays and the ATCR on-time performance
measures have been inconsistent.
Among consumer complaints, the DOT does not judge the validity of each complaint.
No analysis of the bias of the complaining population has been done. Additionally, the negative
publicity of the industry may have an effect on the volume of complaints, creating a potentially
positive feedback loop. Young et al conclude that while the DOT developed this report in
response to Congressional pressure, they have made no efforts to update or revise the report.
Young et al suggest that after the ATCR was developed (early 1990's), service
competition became a key competitive element in the industry. Frequent flyer programs and
growing internationalization, they argue, increased the relevance of service competition.
However, in the airline industry the only measures of service quality were production measures:
flight frequency, load factors, transit time and type of aircraft (Jordan 1970, Douglas and Miller
1974). Customer perception had not yet received any attention.
Young et al sought to examine the following research questions:
m How well did SERVQUAL and industry-based measures predict customer satisfaction and
intention to re-patronize?
- How much consumer awareness and use is there of the ATCR or the information contained
therein?
They conducted a survey consisting of three sections: a series of evaluations of the
quality of services provided by the last airline they flew (including both SERVQUAL
dimensions and general industry-based items), consumer use and importance of the ATCR and
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personal and demographic characteristics. The sample was a group of 105 business school
students, so the results cannot be generalized to the entire airline traveling population.
From the first section of the survey, there were five factor groupings of the industry-
based dimensions. These are shown in the table below.
Table 6. Airline Industry Measures in Young et al Study
Baggage Handling
1) Airline baggage handling is prompt and efficient
2) Airline interline agreements work well for the consumer
3) Airline check-in is efficient
Bumping Procedures
4) Airline bumping procedures are unfair/inconvenient
5) Airline bumping procedures provide inadequate compensation for the trouble caused
6) Information provided by airline at airport is inadequate
Operations and Safety
7) Ticket and reservations procedures prior to arrival at the airport are adequate
8) Airline is safe
9) Airline selects the right equipment for trips
10) Amenities provided by airline is important to the comfort of passengers
11) Airline distinguishes between each class through service
Inflight Comfort
12) Airline seats have good pitch
13) Airline seats are wide enough
14) There is enough room in the aisles of the airline you usually fly
15) The layout of seats in aircraft is just right
16) Airline food and beverage service is good
Connections
17) Airline offers sufficient flight frequency
18) Airline offers flights at right times of the day and night
19) Airline correctly coordinates connections
20) Airline offers sufficient non-stop flights
21) Airline offers sufficient connecting flights.
Two overall measures of quality were included: satisfaction with the most recent trip and
intention to continue to fly on the same airline. They ran regressions on these two overall
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measures using the indices of the SERVQUAL dimensions and then the factor groups of the
industry-based dimensions.
Because the current study seeks to understand what causes customer dissatisfaction, only
the regression of SERVQUAL indices on Satisfaction will be discussed. Two dimensions were
significant: Reliability (coefficient 0.42, p<0.01) and Assurance (coefficient 0.26, p<0.10). The
attributes of these dimensions are reviewed in the table below:
Table 7. Detailed Measures of Reliability and Assurance in SERVQUAL
Reliability
m Promise to do something in timely fashion
" Sympathetic and reassuring to problems
" Dependable
" Provides services at times it promises to
- Keeps records accurately
Assurance
" Can trust employees
= Feel safe in your transactions with employees
" Polite employees
m Employees get support in their jobs
Clearly, timeliness and dependability are two key issues for customers in generating airline
customer satisfaction. In addition, the human interactions - with reservations agents, gate
agents, flight attendants, pilots and baggage personnel - are all relevant in the customers'
ultimate satisfaction with the entire experience.
Young et al also conducted a regression of the industry-based factors on satisfaction.
They found three significant variables: Connections (coefficient 0.41, p<0.01), Comfort
(coefficient 0.22, p<0.05) and Bumping (coefficient 0.15, p<O. 10). Again, the specific attributes
are reviewed below.
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Table 8. Detailed Measures of Connections, Comfort and Bumping in Airline Industry
Measures in Young et al Study
Connections
- Sufficient flight frequency
- Flights at right times of day and night
m Correctly coordinates connections
" Sufficient non-stop flights
- Sufficient connecting flights
Comfort
- Good seat pitch
- Seats wide enough
= Enough room in aisles
- Layout of seats just right
- Food and beverage service is good
Bumping
- Bumping procedures are fair
- Adequate compensation for bumping
- Information is adequate
This result suggests that flight frequency and timing along with on-board comfort are additional
significant determinants of satisfaction. The limitation of the results of all these studies is the
lack of tradeoff between the reliability/assurance attributes and the connections/comfort/bumping
attributes. One does not know whether all five of these issues are significant determinants of
satisfaction since the two analyses were conducted separately. The study demonstrates the
importance to examining flight timing, flight frequency, on-board comfort, information
dissemination and bumping practices in studying customer satisfaction. However, the study fails
to inform us which of these issues is most important to customer dissatisfaction. Hence, it is
important for us to study these issues further in our research.
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3.4. Airline Quality Report
One of the most publicly disseminated studies of airline service quality is the Airline
Quality Report (AQR) conducted annually by the W. Frank Barton School of Business at
Wichita State University and the University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute. This
report receives significant press each year when it is published in early April. The authors of
the AQR consider it to be an industry standard because it provides consumers and industry
watchers with a means to compare quality among airlines using objective performance-based
data. AQR is a weighted average of multiple elements: on-time performance, denied boardings,
mishandled baggage and customer complaints. The weights are established by surveying 65
airline industry experts regarding their opinion as to what consumers would rate as important (on
a scale of 0 to 10) in judging airline quality. In the April 2001 report, the input factors and
weights were: On-Time Performance (weight 8.63), Denied Boardings (8.03), Mishandled
Baggage (7.92) and Customer Complaints (7.17). When all criteria, weights and impacts are
combined for an airline and averaged over the year, a single interval scaled value is obtained.
This value is comparable across airlines and across time periods. The AQR for 2001 is
calculated as: AQR = [(+8.63 x OT) + (-8.03 x DB) + (-7.92 x MB) + (-7.17 x CC)]/ (8.63 + 8.03
+ 7.92 + 7.17).
A key limitation to the AQR process is that the development of these weights is
undocumented. It is unclear whether the 65 experts interviewed necessarily understand the
determinants of customer satisfaction. Headley and Brown have left this portion of their analysis
undiscussed, and it makes the academic observer wonder how much to believe the results. The
problem with all of this is that in the airline industry, the AQR receives extensive coverage and
attention from the media. Should the results be inaccurate, this kind of a study could be
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extremely dangerous to the well being of the industry. The success of the AQR is more fodder
for the need for a quality understanding of customer satisfaction with the airlines.
3.5. Industry Studies of Airlines
The bulk of information available about airline customer needs comes from the many
surveys industry participants conduct on airline customers. For example, OAG and Frequent
Flyer Magazine conduct an annual survey of travelers. In 2001, Money Magazine, AAA and
Zagats all published results from their own airline surveys. These studies are all helpful for
insight into the industry and its customers, but they cannot be relied on as authoritative studies of
the industry. Their methodologies are undocumented, both in terms of data collection and
analysis, so one cannot understand the limitations and ultimately how to interpret the results.
One customer satisfaction study worth noting is conducted by the firm J.D. Power along
with Frequent Flyer Magazine. J.D. Power has a strong reputation in the world of customer
satisfaction. The study suggests that of all travel segments, satisfaction with the airlines is
lowest. The most common reported air travel problems were with on-time performance, seating
issues, carry-on luggage space, food service and post-flight baggage delivery. It is important to
note that while there is some consistency with this survey and the results of Young et al (on-
board comfort issues), the majority of issues causing customer dissatisfaction are different
between the two studies. This is more indication that further study on the subject is needed.
3.6. Department of Transportation Customer Complaint Data
The most extensive source of customer data in the airline industry is D.O.T. complaint
data. Currently they accept complaints via phone, e-mail or regular mail. Each month the
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D.O.T. publishes data on the number of complaints and category for each carrier. Categories of
complaints are listed in the table below:
Table 9. Categories of Complaints in Department of Transportation Complaint Data
" Flight Problems: Cancellations, delays, or any other deviations from schedule, whether
planned or unplanned.
- Oversales: All bumping problems, whether or not the airline complied with DOT
oversale regulations.
" Reservations, Ticketing, and Boarding: Airline or travel agent mistakes in reservations
and ticketing; problems in making reservations and obtaining tickets due to busy
telephone lines or waiting in line, or delays in mailing tickets. Problems boarding the
aircraft (except oversales).
- Fares: Incorrect or incomplete information about fares, discount fare conditions and
availability, overcharges, fare increases and level of fares in general.
- Refunds: Problems in obtaining refunds for unused or lost tickets, fare adjustments, or
bankruptcies.
m Baggage: Claims for lost, damaged or delayed baggage, charges for excess baggage,
carry-on problems, and difficulties with airline claim procedure.
- Customer Service: Rude or unhelpful employees, inadequate meals or cabin service,
treatment of delayed passengers.
m Disability: Civil rights complaints by air travelers with disabilities.
= Advertising: Advertising that is unfair, misleading or offensive to consumers.
- Tours: Problems with scheduled or charter tour packages.
- Animals: Loss, injury or death of an animal during air transport provided by an air
carrier.
- Other: Frequent flyer, smoking, credit, cargo problems, security, airport facilities, claims
for bodily injury, and other not classified above.
The data in the charts below shows how large each complaint category is now and how
this has changed over time. As the chart shows, flight problems, customer service and baggage
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are clearly the largest complaint categories. As Young et al mention in their work, no
examination has been conducted as to the accuracy of this report. Specifically, there is no way to
determine if self-reported complaints are naturally biased to specific categories. The D.O.T.
would suggest that airline customer dissatisfaction is most motivated by delay and cancellation,
rude and unhelpful employees and baggage transfer problems. It is also interesting to note that
the relative weight of customer service and baggage problems have remained essentially constant
over time while that of delay and cancellation has grown over the past three years.
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Figure 6. Distribution of Complaints to DOT by Category Over Time
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Percentage of Complaints to DOT by Category
Figure 7. Distribution of Complaints to DOT in 2000
3.7. eComplaints Customer Complaint Data
In this research project, MIT partnered with the website www.eComplaints.com to share
knowledge about airline customers. eComplaints is a site where consumers can voice complaints
about any company or any industry. The management of eComplaints allowed our research team
access to confidential reports and analysis of their complaint data. The complaints are registered
by the customer and self-classified. The categories are described in the table below:
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Table 10. Categories of Complaints in eComplaints
* Schedule
- Delays
- Cancellations
* Service
- Rude service
- Limited Assistance
* Luggage Handling
- Lost/Damaged/Stolen
- No compensation
* Poor Coordination
- With other airlines
- No info about flight changes
- Flight overbooked
* Airfare Problems
- Overcharging
- Frequent flyer credit
e Creature Comforts
As the table shows, there is similarity between the D.O.T. categories and the eComplaints
categories. The eComplaints category Schedule corresponds to the DOT category Flight
Problems. Service corresponds to Customer Service, and Luggage corresponds to Baggage.
The data in the figure below suggests that issues of schedule, service and luggage attributes were
complained about most frequently. These results are consistent with D.O.T. data in which delay
and cancellation, rude and unhelpful employees and baggage transfer problems received the most
complaints.
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Distribution of Complaints on eComplaints.com
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Figure 8. Complaints by Category on eComplaints.com
While there appears to be some consistency in DOT and eComplaints data on issues of
customer dissatisfaction (mishandled luggage, on-time performance, personal interactions), there
are a number of reasons further study is necessary on airline customer satisfaction. First, a
number of studies presented earlier do not necessarily state that luggage, on-time performance
and interactions with employees are the three most important categories in airline customer
satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Other issues raised include on-board comfort, quality of food,
flight frequency and bumping procedures. Since neither eComplaints nor DOT complaints is
regarded as an authority on customer dissatisfaction, it is important to further study the issue.
Another reason further study is warranted is to go a layer deeper into understanding the
causes of dissatisfaction. For example, even if on-time performance is an important cause of
dissatisfaction, there are many reasons for flight delays. One may wonder whether all causes of
delay are equally dissatisfying to the customer. Similarly, customer service interactions occur
with check-in agents, gate agents and flight attendants. There are multiple manifestations of the
customer service interaction dimension, and not all will necessarily create the same level of
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dissatisfaction. Before government takes any regulatory actions, they should understand the
problem at this level of complexity.
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Chapter 4. Research Objective and Methodology
We conducted a customer survey to understand the causes of airline customer
dissatisfaction. We first conceptualized a framework of the airline customer experience. Then
we conducted a customer survey to assess which components of this framework cause
dissatisfaction.
4.1. Development of the Framework of the Airline Customer
The framework of the customer experience was conceptualized based on industry
knowledge and experience. The framework was validated using customer complaint data from
www.eComplaints.com. Anecdotes from eComplaints were reviewed to ensure that the most
frequent negative customer experiences were captured in this framework. Finally, feedback was
received on the framework from both the faculty in the MIT Global Airline Industry study and
<- Phases -
Purchase, Ticketing
and Delivery
Experience
Check-in, Waiting
and Boarding
Experience
(At airport)
On-Board Experience
(On the plane)
e The Itinerary
e Distribution
(booking, purchase,
ticketing)
e Call-Ins
(changes, seat
assignment, etc.)
e Personal Interactions
(check-in, boarding,
cancellations)
e Check-in
" Walking and Waiting
" Boarding
- Cancellations
- Comfort
e Food
* In-flight entertainment
* Personal Interactions
(flight attendants and
pilots)
e Departure Timeliness
e Connection experience
* Ultimate Arrival
Timeliness
Figure 9. Framework of the Airline Customer Experience
e Luggage
" Frequent flyer points
e Complaints
Page 63
Timeliness and
Connections
Post Flight
Experience
(Off the plane)
T
4
managers at Northwest Airlines.
The framework is shown in the picture above. The customer experience is
conceptualized in five phases:
1. Purchase, Ticketing and Delivery
2. Check-In, Waiting and Boarding
3. On-Board
4. Timeliness and Connections
5. Post-Flight
Within each of the five phases are individual attributes of that component of the experience. For
example, in the On-Board phase of the customer experience, specific attributes include comfort,
food, entertainment and personal interactions.
4.2. Survey Content
The goal of the survey was to understand the causes of airline customer dissatisfaction.
The customer framework was developed through the study of customer complaint data. The
survey content consisted of hypothetical airline experiences which were created directly from the
customer experience framework. Each attribute of the customer experience was examined and a
list of potential negative experiences associated with this attribute was developed. For example,
consider the attribute Personal Interactions within the On-Board phase. Two potential negative
experiences were brainstormed for this attribute: 1) The flight attendants are rude and 2) The
flight attendants are incompetent. In this way, negative experiences were developed for each
attribute of the customer experience framework.
Initially, a list of 84 hypothetical airline experience attributes were developed from the
customer experience framework. All such phrases were worded negatively since the goal of this
research is to understand customer dissatisfaction and since the experience was based on
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customer complaint data. A pilot survey was conducted on members of the MIT faculty to test
the list of airline experiences and the survey methodology (discussed below). From the survey
pre-testing, redundancy was discovered within the list of negative experiences, and were
eliminated. The final condensed list of negative experiences consisted of 48 items.
4.3. Survey Sample
The survey was conducted on students at Harvard Business School in Boston,
Massachusetts. This sample was chosen because it is a group with extensive travel experience
and easily targetable. Most students at Harvard Business School come from work experiences
that involved frequent business travel. The group of students can be contacted easily on e-mail
lists. It is important to note that while the Harvard Business School student sample has provided
tremendous insight into the causes of customer dissatisfaction, this sample has limitations. The
Harvard Business School student community is not necessarily representative of all airline
travelers. Results of the survey will provide insight into why Harvard Business School students
are dissatisfied with air travel but not why the public at large is dissatisfied. This study should
be regarded as a pilot study to begin learning about causes of dissatisfaction. It will also help us
understand the success of this research approach. It should be followed by much broader work
to study various segments of airline travelers.
4.4. Demographics of Respondents
A brief review of demographics of the 49 respondents in this survey is presented here.
All respondents were 34 years of age or under, with all but 2 falling into the range 25-34 years
old. Sixty-five percent of respondents were male, and the remaining thirty-five percent were
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female. The sample of respondents have extensive airline travel experience. They averaged over
16.2 domestic business trips per year (before business school) and 7.1 domestic leisure trips per
year. Internationally, they averaged 5.3 business trips per year (before business school) and 2.6
leisure trips per year. The full set of travel data is presented in the tables below.
Table 11. Travel Experience of Respondent Sample
Domestic Business Trips Per Year Domestic Leisure Trips Per Year
0-3 11% 0-3 31%
4-6 9% 4-6 29%
7-10 11% 7-10 20%
11-15 17% 11-15 10%
16-20 13% 16-20 6%
20+ 40% 20+ 4%
International Business as Per Year International Leisur rips Per Year
0-1 26% 0-1 43%
2-3 22% 2-3 43%
4-6 14% 4-6 8%
7-10 12% 7-10 2%
More than 10 24% More than 10 4%
4.5. Survey Methodology
The goal of the survey was to measure the importance of the various negative airline
experiences in causing airline customer dissatisfaction. One should note the goal was not to
develop one overall dissatisfaction metric. To accomplish our goal, a seven-point dissatisfaction
scale was used anchored by Extremely Dissatisfied and Not at All Dissatisfied. In pre-testing,
other methodologies were tested, such as pairwise comparisons, but it was found that the
simplest approach was to use an absolute rating scale. A seven-point scale was selected over a
five-point scale to offer more points on the scale for each respondent. Because the respondent is
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given a set of negative experiences, responses are expected to be weighted more heavily towards
the Extremely dissatisfied end as opposed to the Not at All dissatisfied end of the scale. By
offering two additional points on the scale, the respondent should have more room for response
variability.
The survey was operationalized using an on-line survey website: www.zoomerang.com.
The survey announcement was sent by a member of the Harvard Business school class to his
fellow classmates with an additional reminder after ten days. The potential respondents were
offered an incentive of admission into a drawing for gift certificates by filling out the survey. In
addition, we targeted the respondents by telling them their response data would be shared with
senior management of airlines. The results of this survey will be shared with the advisory board
of the MIT Global Airline Industry study (the sponsor of this research) at a future advisory board
meeting. A number of airline senior executives are members of this board.
4.6. Sections of Survey
Respondents were presented with eight sections in the customer survey:
1) Ticket Purchase
2) Check-In, Waiting & Boarding
3) Cancellations
4) On-Board
5) Timeliness
6) Connections
7) Luggage
8) Other
The specific hypothetical negative experiences for each section are detailed below:
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Ticket Purchase
1) You spend an hour on the phone trying to book your ticket
2) The reservation agent on the phone is incompetent when you book or change your ticket
3) The reservation agent on the phone is rude when you book or change your ticket
4) You try to buy a ticket online but the website is confusing and hard to use
5) You cannot get a seat assignment even though you call the airline well in advance of the
flight
6) You pay seven times as much as the person sitting next to you
7) You cannot change your itinerary without paying a $100 penalty
Check-In, Waiting & Boarding
8) You stand in line for an hour trying to check-in
9) The check-in agent is rude
10) The check-in agent is incompetent
11) It's a 25 minute walk to gate
12) The departure lounge (or gate) is packed and there's nowhere to sit
13) Flight is overbooked & you get bumped off (but receive some compensation)
14) You are forced to gate-check your carry-on bags
15) You overhear that a passenger didn't get on board but his/her checked bags are not being
removed from the plane
Cancellations
16) Flight gets cancelled and you get to your destination hours after you expected
17) Flight gets cancelled due to mechanical problem
18) Flight gets cancelled due to missing crewmember
19) Flight gets cancelled due to weather
20) Flight gets cancelled and you wait in line over an hour to rebook
On-Board
21) Seats are cramped
22) You are in a middle seat with people on both sides
23) Your seat is in the last row of the airplane
24) The meal on board is cold & small
25) There are not enough flight attendants to handle the flight
26) The flight attendants are incompetent
27) The flight attendants are rude
Timeliness
28) You depart 2 hours late because of a mechanical problem
29) You depart 2 hours late because of weather
30) You depart 2 hours late and the airline provides no explanation why
31) You depart 2 hours late in good weather because so many planes are scheduled at the same
time
32) You depart 2 hours late but the airline keeps you updated about the cause and length of the
delay
33) You depart 2 hours late waiting for a crew member to show up
Page 68
34) You pull back from the gate on time but then wait for 2 hours on the tarmac
35) You are told there is a short delay but it keeps increasing and you end up departing 2 hours
late
Connections
36) When making a connection, the walk between gates is extremely long
37) When making a connection, you have to change terminals
38) When making a connection, you have to claim and recheck luggage
39) When making a connection, you have to gate-check carry-ons due to space limits on the 2nd
flight
40) When making a connection, you can't seem to find the connection gate anywhere
Luggage
41) The airline loses your checked luggage
42) You wait 45 minutes to claim your luggage
43) Your bags are lost or damaged & and you wait in line 45 minutes to report this
44) It takes the airlines 5 days to find your missing bags
45) The airline does not compensate you for bags that are lost or damaged
Other
46) You try to book a vacation with frequent flyer points but no seats are available anywhere
you'd like to go
47) Your frequent flyer points are not recorded even though you gave your number at check-in
48) You complain to the airline and never hear back
4.7. Customer Dissatisfaction vs. Customer Choice
The goal of this research is to understand why customers are dissatisfied with air travel,
not to determine models that understand customer choice. Ultimately this information should be
interesting to public policymakers to understand how to keep the traveling public satisfied. And
it should be interesting to airlines to understand what issues are most important to keep public
lawmakers satisfied that the airlines are working with the public interest in mind. One should
not expect the results of this study to necessarily match one's intuitive feeling about what
motivates purchase.
Airline customer choice is well understood through intuition and academic studies
(Proussaloglou & Koppelman, 1999). Travelers segment into two key groups: leisure travelers
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and business travelers. Typically, business travelers purchase on the basis of schedule. They are
less sensitive to price because their company usually pays the airfare. Since these are frequent
travelers, their choice is also often influenced by their frequent flyer membership. Leisure
travelers, on the other hand, are most driven by price in their purchase decision. Whether
considering a business or leisure traveler, however, the drivers of purchase are typically
intangible. They are not linked directly to the experience itself.
4.8. Limitations of Methodology
While this study sheds light on the problem of airline customer dissatisfaction, it has its
limitations. No list of service dimensions can ever be complete, and this is especially true with
the airline customer experience. Simply put, there are many things which can go wrong, and not
everything is necessarily captured. Given our methodology discussed above, we believe that all
critical negative experiences are captured, but the list cannot be regarded as exhaustive.
To keep the survey to a reasonable length, for a number of negative experiences, a point
estimate was used to describe a spectrum of experiences. For example, within all of the delay
experiences, a delay of two hours was utilized and the reasons for delay were varied. Ideally,
both the reasons and length of delay would have varied, but there was not enough time with the
respondent to do this. Also the respondent set was not large enough to vary the length of delay
across respondents. In addition to the delay experiences, the luggage wait experiences utilized a
point estimate of 45 minutes and waits in line were estimated by one hour in length.
The sample of business school students should not be considered representative of the
entire air travel population. This sample is heavily weighted towards business travel. It is also
highly educated and skewed younger than the typical airline traveler. Before results of this kind
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of study can be generalized, more data analysis would be necessary to address the needs of other
air travel segments.
The respondents in this survey are presented with a series of hypothetical scenarios. This
was done for simplicity and to keep the survey short. If the respondent had discussed an actual
scenario, there would have been extensive data to collect regarding the trip. This was not done
for limits on time with the respondent. Because of this, the survey gained in simplicity but lost
in reality. All responses are self-stated, which is less desirable than behavioral data.
Since the respondent examined and rated each negative experience independently, one
cannot utilize the data from this study to understand the tradeoffs respondents make between
different negative experiences. This would have required a separate methodology, such as
conjoint analysis or discrete choice analysis. This methodology was considered but not chosen,
again due to limits on the number of respondents and the amount of time each respondent was
expected to spend filling out the survey. The data from the survey allows for a direct comparison
between the importance of various negative experiences, but not the tradeoffs inherent between
them.
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Chapter 5. Survey Results
5.1. Research Hypotheses
Examination of previous research and data sources discussed in Chapter 2 of this study
suggests that the following experiences may influence customer satisfaction:
m Personal comfort on-board
" Personal interactions (check-in, flight attendants)
- On-time luggage delivery
" On-time performance
- Information
- Being heard
- Fair bumping procedures
- Price
- Safety
- Sufficient frequency
This long list demonstrates the lack of consensus about why consumers are dissatisfied with air
travel. Given the variety of issues that may impact customer dissatisfaction, we analyzed the
survey data without any pre-conceived notions of the causes of customer dissatisfaction. The
results of the survey analysis are discussed in the remainder of this chapter.
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5.2. General Results of Customer Survey
The average rating for each negative airline experience is shown in rank order from worst
to best in the figure on the next page. As the data suggests, the issues of luggage transfer,
customer experience during delay and cancellation and customer-employee relations are critical
issues for the industry to manage. In the next three sub-sections, we address customer
dissatisfaction issues with irregular operations, luggage and labor. We look at the nature of the
dissatisfaction and discuss current industry dynamics affecting the issues. For each, we discuss
how this issue might affect the industry in the future.
5.2.1. Irregular Operations in the Airline Operations
Customer impact from irregular operations - delays and cancellations - occupy eight of
the top twenty most important experiences causing customer dissatisfaction. This data is
consistent with that of the D.O.T. Air Travel Consumer Report and eComplaints, where the
Delay and Cancellation category receives the highest number of complaints. Industry operations
have been hampered in recent years as the air transportation system has been unable to meet the
growth in air travel demand. The situation is expected to get worse in the future as enplanements
are expected to grow from 650 million in 2000 to nearly 1 billion by the year 2010." In the
analysis in this section, we attempt to gain a more visceral understanding of customer feeling
about delay and cancellation. Specifically, we address the following questions:
" How important is information to customers during irregular operations?
= Is there a difference in dissatisfaction between delay and cancellation?
m Do customers react differently to different causes of delay or cancellation?
See FAA National Airspace Operational Evolution Plan (OEP)
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How dissatisfied would you be if the
following happened to you?
The airline does not compensate you for bags that are lost or damaged .90
The airline loses your checked luggage 16.78
It takes the airlines 5 days to find your missing bags 6.78
Your bags are lost or damaged & and you wait in line 45 minutes to report this 6.73
You depart 2 hours late and the airline provides no explanation why 16.67
You stand in line for an hour trying to check-in 6.45
Flight gets cancelled and you wait in line over an hour to rebook 6 45
You pull back from the gate on time but then wait for 2 hours on the tarmac 6.45
The reservation agent on the phone is rude when you book or change your ticket 6.43
The reservation agent on the phone is incompetent when you book or change your ticket 6.35
You depart 2 hours late waiting for a crew member to show up 6.31
You spend an hour on the phone trying to book your ticket 16 29
Flight gets cancelled due to missing crewmember 6 29
Told there is a short delay but it keeps increasing and you end up departing 2 hours late 6 29
Flight gets cancelled and you get to your destination hours after you expected 1 6 27
You complain to the airline and never hear back 6.22
Depart 2 hours late in good weather because many planes are scheduled at the same time 6 19
The check-in agent is incompetent 6.12
The check-in agent is rude 6 06
The flight attendants are rude 5.84
Your frequent flyer points are not recorded even though you gave your number at check-in 5.73
You wait 45 minutes to claim your luggage 5.69
When making a connection, you have to claim and recheck luggage 5.35
When making a connection, you can't seem to find the connection gate anywhere 5.23
You try book vacation with frequent flyer points but no seats available where you'd like to go 5.12
You pay seven times as much as the person sifting next to you 5.06
You depart 2 hours late because of a mechanical problem 5.00
You cannot change your itinerary without paying a $100 penalty 4-88
It's a 25 minute walk to gate 4.82
You try to buy a ticket online but the website is confusing and hard to use 4.78
Flight is overbooked & you get bumped off (but receive some compensation) 4.73
Overhear a passenger didn't board but his/her checked bags are not being removed from the plane 4.69
When making connection, you have to gate-check carry-ons due to space limits on the 2nd flight 4.69
Flight gets cancelled due to mechanical problem 4.65
Seats are cramped 4.59
You are in a middle seat with people on both sides 4.57
You cannot get a seat assignment even though you call the airline well in advance of the flight 4.54
You are forced to gate-check your carry-on bags 4.43
The flight attendants are incompetent 4.39
When making a connection, you have to change terminals |14.31
You depart 2 hours late but airline keeps you updated about the cause and length of the delay
Your seat is in the last row of the airplane 4.08
The departure lounge (or gate) is packed and there's nowhere to sit 4.02
The meal on board is cold & small 3.90
You depart 2 hours late because of weather 3.80
When making a connection, the walk between gates is extremely long 3.73
There are not enough flight attendants to handle the flight 3.73
Flight gets cancelled due to weather 3.61
Somewhat Very Extremely
Dissatisfied Unsatisfied Dissatisfied
Figure 10. Complete Results of Airline Customer Survey
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We conclude with a discussion of what is being done to improve system capacity and the volume
of delay.
Importance of information during irregular operations
In this analysis, we compared the responses for each respondent to two questions that addressed
the issue of a significantly late departure and examined the difference in dissatisfaction for each
respondent:
" You depart 2 hours late and the airline provides no explanation why
" You depart 2 hours late but the airline keeps you updated about the cause and length of
the delay
Every respondent in our study had an equal or greater level of dissatisfaction in the first situation
than the second, implying that when travelers have information about the nature of the delay,
they are less dissatisfied about the delay. This result is consistent with the work of Taylor (1994)
in which she found that customers with higher levels of uncertainty (less information) were more
dissatisfied with their airline customer experience. In fact, in our research only 10% of
respondents felt no change in dissatisfaction when given information about the delay.
The responses of over half of respondents (52%) increased by 2 or 3 points on the seven
point dissatisfaction scale between the two questions analyzed. All respondents either moved
from Somewhat Dissatisfied to Very Dissatisfied or from Very Dissatisfied to Extremely
Dissatisfied. An additional one-fifth of respondents (21%) had an even more extreme shift in
dissatisfaction, moving from Somewhat Dissatisfied to Extremely Dissatisfied.
The results, summarized in the table below, suggest that airline management of
information to the customer is a critical component of customer satisfaction. In fact, on an
absolute basis, the attribute "You depart 2 hours late but the airline keeps you updated about the
cause and length of the delay" was rated 41st out of 48 attributes in the survey. Relative to other
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negative experiences, a delay with consistent updates and information falls to the bottom 15% of
negative experiences.
Table 12. Shift in Customer Dissatisfaction when Given No Information Regarding Delay
vs. When Given Information
Dissatisfaction between delay and a cancellation
In this analysis, we selected three pairs of statements from our survey and examined the
difference in dissatisfaction ratings between each pair of statements:
- Flight gets cancelled due to missing crewmember
- You depart 2 hours late waiting for a crewmember to show up
- Flight gets cancelled due to weather
- You depart 2 hours late because of weather
- Flight gets cancelled due to mechanical problem
- You depart 2 hours late because of a mechanical problem
Differences were calculated between the cancellation and delay ratings for each of the three
reasons: mechanical problem, missing crewmember and weather. For the first two (missing
crewmember and weather), it was found that almost no difference exists in the dissatisfaction
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Less dissatisfaction
No change in dissatisfaction
Shift 1 point up on scale
Shift 2 or 3 points up on scale, moving from Somewhat Dissatisfied to
Very Dissatisfied or from Very Dissatisfied to Extremely Dissatisfied
Shift 4 points up on scale, moving from Somewhat Dissatisfied to
Extremely Dissatisfied
0%
10%
11%
52%
21%
ratings for cancellation and delay. Paired t-tests also indicate that neither of these are significant
differences. This implies that we cannot reject a hypothesis that no difference exists between
dissatisfaction from cancellation and dissatisfaction from delay due to missing crewmember or
weather.
The question becomes even more intriguing when we look at the results for irregular
operations due to mechanical problems. The difference in dissatisfaction (cancellation rating
minus delay rating) is -0.35. A two-tailed paired t-test indicates that at a 90% confidence level a
significant difference exists between the dissatisfaction rating for cancellation due to mechanical
problem and cancellation due to a mechanical problem. The data is summarized in the table
below.
Table 13. Difference in Dissatisfaction Between Cancellation and Delay by Cause
Reason for Irregular Operation Difference in Dissatisfaction Ratings
(Cancellation minus Delay)
Missing crew member 
-0.02
Weather -0.18
Mechanical problem -0.35
The result is intriguing because a 2-hour delay due to a mechanical problem is more dissatisfying
than a cancellation due to a mechanical problem. On the surface, one might hypothesize that a
cancellation would be worse than a delay. At least in a delay, a passenger is likely to arrive at
his or her destination on the correct day. With a cancellation, the uncertainty of when one
reaches his or her destination increases.
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Given this, we can formulate an informed hypothesis regarding airline customers' views
of mechanical problems. With a mechanical problem, a customer may feel more comfortable
with a cancellation than a delay. Customers that know their aircraft is having mechanical
problems and undergoing repairs for the two hours leading up to the flight may be more nervous
about the flight. A cancellation, while likely resulting in increased delay and uncertainty, offers
the comfort that one will not have to fly on the aircraft with the mechanical problem.
The larger question remains whether customers have a difference in satisfaction with
respect to delay and cancellation. Another test was done by averaging dissatisfaction with all
reasons for cancellation and averaging dissatisfaction with all reasons for delay. A paired t-test
of the differences in dissatisfaction from cancellation and dissatisfaction from delay was done.
On average, dissatisfaction from cancellations minus dissatisfaction from delays was -0.18. The
t-test resulted in a t value of -1.9795 and a p-value of 0.0535. This means at the 90% confidence
level, we can state that a significant difference exists between dissatisfaction with delay and
dissatisfaction with cancellation.
However, the same analysis was conducted for all causes of cancellation and delay
excluding mechanical problems. The result was a difference in dissatisfaction of -0.07. The t-
test resulted in a t-value of -0.7698 and a p-value of 0.4452, indicating no significant differences
at the 90% confidence level. It can therefore be concluded that customers retain no difference in
dissatisfaction from cancellation and from delay, except in the case of a mechanical problem. In
that situation, customers are more comfortable to deal with a cancellation because of safety
reasons. These results are different than what was expected, as one might have thought that
cancellations would result in greater dissatisfaction than delay. However, it is safe to think about
cancellation and delay as evoking similar levels of dissatisfaction.
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Customer reaction to different causes of delay or cancellation
As discussed in Chapter 1, the airline industry has received extensive media attention and
governmental scrutiny because of the growth in delay and cancellation in the late 1990's and
2000. The subject is typically addressed at a high level, with all delays grouped into one
category. However, irregular operations occur for different reasons, and not all reasons
necessarily elicit the same customer reaction.
We address cancellations first, and three reasons are examined:
" Missing crewmember
" Mechanical problem
" Weather
The results clearly demonstrate that a missing crewmember cancellation is significantly worse
than a mechanical problem cancellation, which is significantly worse than a weather
cancellation. The results of paired t-tests within respondents show that significant differences
exist between these three reasons for flight cancellation.
Table 14. Comparison of Dissatisfaction Ratings Between Different Causes of Flight
Cancellation
Attributes Under Comparison Difference in Paired T-test between
Dissatisfaction Dissatisfaction Ratings
Rating (t-statistic; p-value)
Missing Crewmember vs. Mechanical 1.63 t=6.6822; p=0.0000
Missing Crewmember vs. Weather 2.67 t=11.1436; p=0.0000
Mechanical vs. Weather 1.04 t=4.4754; p=0.0000
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The results are consistent with those of Taylor (1994). A reason for cancellation that is in the
airline's control (such as a missing crewmember) results in the greatest level of dissatisfaction.
The reason that is most out of their control (weather delays) causes the least level of
dissatisfaction. In fact, among all the 48 negative experiences proposed to customers in the
entire survey, a flight cancellation due to weather had the lowest level of dissatisfaction.
A similar analysis was done for flight delays. For delays we had four causes:
- Missing crewmember
- Mechanical problem
- Weather
= Overscheduling
Table 15. Comparison of Dissatisfaction Rating Between Different Causes of Flight Delay
Attributes Under Comparison Difference in Paired T-test between
Dissatisfaction Dissatisfaction Ratings
Rating (t-statistic; p-value)
Mechanical vs. Weather 1.20 t=7.1058; p=0.0000
Mechanical vs. Overscheduling -1.21 t=6.0747; p=0.0000
Mechanical vs. Missing Crewmember -1.31 t=6.7731; p=0.0000
Weather vs. Overscheduling 2.38 t=1 1.9486; p=0.0000
Weather vs. Missing Crewmember 2.51 t=12.1607; p=0.0000
Overscheduling vs. Missing Crewmember 0.10 t=0.6186; p=0.5391
Dissatisfaction with various causes of delays follow the same pattern as dissatisfaction with
various causes of cancellations. A missing crewmember results in the highest level of
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dissatisfaction, followed by mechanical problems which is significantly lower. The least
dissatisfaction is with a delay due to weather.
An additional reason for delay is included beyond those for cancellations. This is the
problem of Overscheduling. Overscheduling occurs when too many planes are scheduled at the
same time beyond the capacity of the airport. As seen in the data above, delays due to
Overscheduling cause the same level of dissatisfaction as a delay to a missing crewmember (the
highest level of dissatisfaction among the causes of delay). This result is significant for a
number of reasons. About 2/3 of scheduled airline traffic in the industry is organized within hub
and spoke networks, and approximately 90% of delay is experienced at these airports.' The
major network airlines operate multiple "banks" of flights each day in which a number of aircraft
from different cities arrive and depart. This way passengers can transfer across multiple flights
and the airline can serve many city pairs with one stop in a hub. The problem of Overscheduling
has arisen because air travel is growing in the U.S. More passengers are flying and demand is
greater than ever before. To meet the demand, airlines need to schedule more flights during their
banks than in the past. As more flights are scheduled during each bank at an airport, the number
of aircraft in the system sometimes exceeds capacity. From the survey data, customers clearly
believe overscheduling delay is within the airlines' control and should be managed effectively by
the airlines. The U.S. economy may be in a downswing at the moment, but air travel will once
again grow, and scheduling practices and air traffic control infrastructure will need to be
effectively managed to meet the demand with the capacity available.
Despite the dissatisfaction, there are some positive signs for airline congestion. The
government has identified capacity as one of the top priorities for this country. In June 2001, the
Federal Aviation Administration released its National Airspace Operational Evolution Plan
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(NAS OEP) which addresses the imbalance between air travel demand and capacity. The FAA
intends to integrate its existing and future activities with those of the industry.
The NAS OEP is layed out in three phases:
Near Term Plan (2001)
- Resolve choke points
- Spring 2002, collaboration and information sharing
Mid-Term Plan (2002-2004)
- Optimize airspace design
- Widespread use of free flight tools
- Reduced vertical separation
- Enhanced navigation procedures
Long-Term Plan (2005-2010)
- Data communication
- Satellite navigation
- Enhanced surveillance
In addition to the FAA, the Boeing Company announced plans in November 2000 of the
establishment of the Air Traffic Management business unit. The group's goal is to improve
safety, reduce delays and open the skies to add more flights. The ATM group at Boeing believes
it can work in a complementary fashion with the FAA to develop a new air traffic management
system quickly. The ATM group has stated three pillars upon which it intends to develop its
system:
- Trajectory-based air traffic management: national and regional flow planning system with
dynamic replanning
= Common information network: utilizing GPS and satellite based communication technology
m Airspace redesign: building off of the FAA redesign
Boeing officials believe this system would reduce delays by nearly 50% and allow for air traffic
growth for the next 15 to 17 years.
12 See FAA Operational Evolution Plan, Version 3.0, June 5, 2001, p. 1
Page 83
5.2.2. Luggage Transfer in the Airline Industry
Customer complaint data from the Department of Transportation and eComplaints
suggests that luggage transfer is an important determinant of customer dissatisfaction. This
belief is confirmed in the data from this survey (detailed below). In the domestic airline industry
there were approximately 750 million pieces of checked baggage moved in 2000.13 According to
the Department of Transportation Air Travel Consumer Report, 2,738,463 pieces of luggage
were reported missing on the ten major airlines in 2000. Major airlines represent just over 80%
of enplanements in the United States, so we estimate that about 3.3 million bags were lost in
2000. This amounts to 0.4% of bags being lost. This analysis is consistent with the Air
Transport Association website which states that 99.5% of bags arrive correctly to their
destination.
The statistics above mean that mistakes with baggage transfer happen rarely. However,
when mistakes with luggage happen, customer outrage is high. The following anecdote from the
website eComplaints summarizes the kind of problems that customers have regarding lost
luggage:
"On arrival [to our destination] we discovered that our case was missing and we were only left with our
garment bag. The following morning, a message was left on our mobile saying that our case still hadn't
been located. I called back early that afternoon and was told once again that they were looking for it but
still could not locate our case.
This case contained all of our toiletries, casual clothes and running shoes, prescribed medicine, phone
chargers and other essentials. When we asked the Virgin representative what we were supposed to do until
our case was found, we could not be given a solution as "the man in charge was not in until tomorrow".
Other airlines, in situations like this, would simply say to buy the essentials. I suggested this and [we were
told] we could buy what we needed.
Each day we had to spend time replacing things, as we needed them. The apartment we were staying in did
not have a telephone and we had to rely on public telephones until we could replace the charger for one of
our phones. We also had to arrange for an out of hours doctor's visit so that we could have our prescribed
medicines replaced. This whole experience was incredibly annoying and in essence ruined our holiday.
13 Approximately 700 million bags were transferred in 1998 (Sharkey 1999). Growth in enplanements between
1998 and 2000 was approximately 3.5% per year. Applying this growth level to baggage, we estimate 750 million
bags were transferred in 2000.
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We were not able to enjoy our holiday as it is very inconvenient without our own belongings, especially
casual clothes, shoes, beach accessories, toiletries, medicine kit, medicines etc.
To add insult to injury, no one from your company bothered to contact us. I had to ring regularly to see if
anything had happened.
To date we still have not received any reimbursement for the money we spent replacing our essential items
in Queensland, phone calls, petrol & airport parking picking up our luggage. Let alone any compensation
for the inconvenience and our invaluable time. This experience has cost me dearly in terms of both time
and money. I would appreciate an immediate response to my claim.
The most disappointing aspect of our experience with Virgin Blue is to find out how little value was placed
on good customer relations. Telephone calls were rarely returned and your staff seemed almost reluctant to
assist us in our plight, and those we did get to speak to acted rather put out that we would expect them to do
something for us - the customer."
This passenger experienced the following typical problems with lost luggage:
- Missing essentials: toiletries, clothes, medications, etc.
- Stress during a vacation or business trip
- Uncertainty about where the bags are or when they will be returned
- Lack of responsiveness or concern from service provider
- No reimbursement for lost time and expenses
The data in our survey suggest that passengers are most fearful of luggage problems. In fact, the
first four luggage related items in the chart below were the worst rated attributes of the entire list
of attributes in the customer survey. Thus, when luggage problems occur, customers are the
angriest.
How dissatisfied would you be if the
following happened to you?
The airline does not compensate you for bags that are lost or damaged
The airline loses your checked luggage 1 6.7
It takes the airlines 5 days to find your missing bags
6190
Your bags are lost or damaged & and you wait in line 45 minutes to report this C I6.7c
You wait 45 minutes to claim your luggage 5.69
Somewhat Very Extremely
Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied
Figure 11. Dissatisfaction Rating with Luggage Transfer in Customer Survey
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The data above raises the question of what the future is for luggage transfer. Since it is
such a sensitive issue for customer dissatisfaction, airlines are constantly mindful of the issue.
One might conclude that conditions are improving. Looking at the data in the figure below, one
can see that lost baggage per enplaned passenger has been trending downwards since 1992. This
might imply that airlines are paying more attention and/or becoming more skilled at the process
of baggage transfer. However, this may or may not be the case. Passengers may be checking in
less luggage. Continental Airlines, for example, has installed larger overhead storage bins in
response to increased customer demand for bringing additional or larger hand bags onto aircraft.
It is possible that baggage handling is not improving and the decrease in lost bags per
enplanements is a result of a decrease in the volume of checked luggage.
Lost Baggage Per 1000 Enplanements
7.00
6.50
6.00
5.50
5.00-
4.50
4.00-
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Figure 12. Lost Baggage Statistics, 1990-2000
The government has correctly identified this weakness in current measurement of
baggage handling statistics. The Inspector General report of February 2001 requested the FAA
and DOT to adjust its baggage transfer metric. It has asked to report how many bags are lost per
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bag checked. This data would be useful for understanding how well the operations of luggage
transfer work. The question remains as to when the DOT will implement this metric and
whether the airlines will lobby against it.
There are research developments that could positively impact the success of luggage
transfer in the future. British Airways has conducted experiments with radio frequency
identification (RFID) luggage tags. Results of tests done by British Airways indicate that
luggage was transferred with 99.99% accuracy (Nelms 1999). Such a system could have the
challenge of getting airlines to agree globally on a common frequency for the tags. Such efforts
and development costs could be worthwhile since currently the airlines pay billions of dollars in
reconciling and reconnecting lost bags with their owners.
Automation has potential for improving the luggage transfer process. Bar codes,
scanners and automated moving systems can be utilized in tandem to move luggage effectively.
However, Goetz and Szyliowicz (1997) discuss a number of problems with implementing
automation in an airport luggage transfer system. They form their discussion in the context of
their case study of the new Denver airport. In Denver, the baggage system was designed to
automatically deliver bags from check-in to the gate. Bags with bar-coded tags were placed into
individual carts, scanned and sent through a series of tracks, scanners and switchers directly to
the gate. They point out two key challenges to this kind of system. First, the mechanical
components must be precise, since there is high potential for carts falling off track or crashing
into other carts or objects. Secondly, millions of lines of software code are required to make the
system work effectively. Any error could cause severe ripple effects in a luggage transfer
system. Goetz and Szyliowicz point out that these issues caused the greatest difficulty in Denver
because the airport authority decided late in construction to develop the automated system for the
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entire airport (and not just one concourse as originally planned). Ultimately they had to pull the
system back to one concourse only because of extensive technical difficulties.
The problem of lost luggage will never disappear completely. One cannot design a
system that would work perfectly during irregular operations. When passengers make extremely
tight connections after a flight delay, there is an increased probability that the luggage will not
make it onto the flight. A passenger can run through the terminal and make a very close
connection, but the same would probably not happen with checked luggage. Given irregular
operations occur as a result of weather or mechanical issues, with even the most advanced air
traffic control system, passengers will always need to remain prepared that luggage transfer
problems might occur. A recent study by Barnett et al (2001) states that in one test irregular
operations were present at six major hub airports in 1992 about 5% of the time.' 4 This data is
almost a decade old, well in advance of recent congestion problems, so one might expect this
figure to be even higher today.
5.2.3. Labor Relations in the Airline Industry
Throughout 2001, the airline industry faced a series of rifts in labor-management
relations. Northwest Airlines, United Airlines, American Airlines and Delta Airlines all faced
major contract negotiation hurdles with large unions. Comair, a regional Delta subsidiary,
endured a three month-long pilot's strike. Newly inaugurated President Bush publicly stated his
desire to avoid any strikes at a major airline. He said, if necessary, the federal government
would get involved in preventing major airline strikes.
14 An hourly period is irregular if at least 1/3 of carrier's departures were canceled or 30+ minutes late. Hubs
include Atlanta, Chicago O'Hare, Dallas-Ft. Worth, Houston Intercontinental, Minneapolis-St. Paul and Pittsburgh
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Contract negotiations at the airlines mentioned above have been resolved, but relations
between labor and management still have much room for improvement. Von Nordenflycht
(2001) discusses three dimensions along which the industry's labor relations dynamic create
"suboptimal results." First, bargaining efficiency, or discussions between labor and management
are "long and often contentious." Second, while strikes are rare, operational disruptions, such as
sickouts, are more frequent. Finally, operating efficiency is not optimized. Labor contracts
contain extensive work rules that decrease the airline's ability to effectively and efficiently
utilize its employees.
All three of these problems can directly impact a customer's experience. For example,
long and contentious labor discussions could create bitterness or anger on the part of front-line
employees. Such bitterness could be imparted to the customer intentionally or unintentionally
during an employee-customer interaction. Operational disruptions, naturally, have a direct and
negative impact on the customer experience. Finally, it is conceivable that increased flexibility
on the part of management to utilize its workforce could improve the efficiency with which it
delivers its product (scheduled airline service) to its customers.
Results of this survey suggest that employee-customer interactions are important factors
in customer dissatisfaction. However, these interactions sit on a second tier of the causes of
dissatisfaction, a step below factors like delays, cancellations and lost luggage. The chart below
shows that there are high levels of dissatisfaction with negative airline employee-customer. The
first two attributes on the list are among the ten most important causes of dissatisfaction. All five
of these are within the top twenty causes of dissatisfaction.
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How dissatisfied would you be if the
following happened to you?
The reservation agent on the phone is rude when you book or change your ticket 6.43
The reservation agent on the phone is incompetent when you book or change your ticket 6.35
The check-in agent is incompetent 16.12
The check-in agent is rude 6.06
The flight attendants are rude 5. 14
SOMONhatVeryExtra
Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Disaa
Figure 13. Dissatisfaction Rating with Employee Interactions in Customer Survey
Mly
Utifid
Although employee behavior is not among the top five reasons for customer
dissatisfaction, it can have a compounding effect on customer dissatisfaction. When first-tier
causes of customer dissatisfaction (irregular operations and luggage transfer problems) occur, it
is the job of front-line employees to deliver the bad news to customers. The manner in which
this communication is handled can have a profound impact on how the customer feels about the
experience. Employees who are dissatisfied with their treatment on the job from management
may have little or no desire to have a positive interaction with the customer. As mentioned
earlier, customers are most dissatisfied in a delay or cancellation when they are given no reason
or explanation why the delay or cancellation has occurred. In the context of irregular operations
or luggage problems, negative interactions only compound the negative customer experience.
Giving front-line employees a reason to trust management and care about the airline and
customer is therefore the key challenge for management-labor relations.
It is also worth noting that a relationship likely exists between airline operations and the
customer-airline employee relationship. When airline operations run smoothly, airline
employees have less responsibility to communicate delays, cancellations, lost baggage and other
negative customer experiences. This engenders a low stress, positive environment for airline
employees to do their jobs. It minimizes passenger and employee stress and avoids passenger
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and employee conflict. In an environment of smooth airline operations, we would expect higher
employee satisfaction and, ultimately, decreased customer dissatisfaction.
5.3. Application to Airline Alliances
In the past decade, global alliances have become an increasingly important component of
the airline customer service mantra. Some stated goals of alliances include expanded network
coverage and consistent customer service. On www.staralliance.com, the international traveler is
told that "[Star] offer[s]... a seamless experience and convenient global access." Similarly, on
www.oneworldalliance.com, the reader is told "oneworld will offer superior, seamless service."
What this "seamless service" means to the customer, however, is not well defined. In fact, many
customers, especially those in the United States that have experienced increased delays in recent
years, claim that individual airlines have trouble providing a seamless experience. Thus,
delivering seamlessness across multiple international carriers may appear far-fetched at first
glance.
This motivates the need to understand what an international traveler perceives as a
seamless customer experience. Alliance partners have many seams along which they need to
coordinate. Some examples include check-in procedures, baggage handling and frequent flier
point redemption. Alliances do not have the resources to perfectly coordinate on all seams and
must understand what seams are most critical to passenger satisfaction. A brief background on
airline alliances and the challenges they face is presented below, followed by a discussion of the
results as they pertain to this growing domain.
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5.3.1. Background on Alliances
An alliance is defined as "relatively enduring inter-firm cooperative arrangements that
involve flows and linkages that utilize resources and/or governance structures from autonomous
organizations, for the joint accomplishment of individual goals linked to the corporate mission of
each sponsoring firm" (Parkhe, 1991). Alliances are developed by multiple firms in a win-win
framework. Each partner shares its specific strengths in the relationship, lending power to the
entire enterprise. The arrangements fit in between traditional sourcing on one end and
acquisition on the other end. Alliances are formed primarily when partnering firms have
strategic gaps in critical differential capabilities, and these capabilities are too expensive or
impossible to acquire (through formal acquisition or development). In layman's terms, both
partners in an alliance have something each other wants but cannot get without each other.
Alliances have been growing dramatically in many industries around the world since the
mid 1980's. Between 1980 and 1987, 5,100 new alliances formed. Between 1987 and 1992,
20,000 new alliances formed and between 1994 and 1996, another 20,000 formed. In 1996,
nearly 15% of revenue for the top 1000 US firms came from alliances, representing a four fold
increase since 1987 (Booz, Allen & Hamilton 1993). Corporations have increasingly seen
alliances as attractive vehicles through which they can grow and expand their scope, and the rate
at which interfirm alliances have been formed in the last two decades has been unprecedented
(Harrigan, 1986).
One driver of alliance growth is market globalization. Trade routes are opening up and
deregulation of businesses is increasing, resulting in more competition across borders. The result
of this is that industry boundaries are blurring. For example, Ford no longer worries only about
GM and Chrysler in Detroit. Competition from Japan and Europe are now as critical as the other
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two major manufacturers in the U.S. Also, businesses are always operating with scarce
resources. With increased competition in the global marketplace, they have to consider new and
creative solutions to running their business. Alliances have been one such solution to deal with
global markets and increased competition.
Some might question why so many alliances have formed instead of many more cross-
border mergers and acquisitions. First, companies have found it extremely difficult to run
another business from overseas. Not having the leadership on the ground in the country, time
zone differences that restrict communication and language barriers all factor into the challenges
to merge a foreign firm into your own. Often times when a company is acquired by a foreign
parent the best managers leave, deciding not to deal with the new environment.
Another reason that alliances outweigh mergers and acquisitions is because it simply may
not be legal, especially in the airline industry. Swissair and Sabena formed the Airline
Management Partnership (AMP)'5 because they were not allowed to merge. If the firms merged
and were owned by a Swiss parent company, the Belgian operation would lose its international
rights to fly from Brussels to various international destinations, except those in Switzerland. By
becoming a Swiss company, the company would be forced to operate according to Swiss rules
permitted in Swiss bilateral agreements.
There are a number of common reasons for which airlines seek out alliances:
- Expansion of seamless service networks
- Traffic feed between partners
- Cost efficiency
- Improvement of service quality (schedule, online connections)
m Marketing advantages: frequent flier programs
15 The AMP is a management structure in which operations management for Swissair and Sabena remain separate
for legal reasons but all other functional (finance, human resources, etc.) are merged into one entity
Page 93
5.3.2. Challenges in Alliance Management
Airline managers have a number of pitfalls to deal with in airline alliances.
Competitively, alliances are often a reactive measure than a proactive one. When a key
competitor announces an alliance, pressure arises both internally and externally (investors) to
remain competitive and enter an alliance. When American and Lufthansa were unable to strike a
deal during US-Germany Open Skies discussions in 1993, United formed an alliance with the
German carrier. American was essentially left only to partner with British Airways to match the
size and scope of the United-Lufthansa alliance. British Airways was likely not American's first
choice, and their alliance has had problems agreeing on sharing transatlantic traffic and in
seeking antitrust immunity.
It is extremely difficult to negotiate the terms of an alliance because often times the
scenario is more vague than an acquisition. The benefits are hypothesized and uncertain, like an
acquisition, but the action plan to implement the deal is more unclear than a merger. Trust
between alliance partners becomes critical to develop the alliance. The discussions can
degenerate into discussions among lawyers and corporate staff, resulting in stagnation. Often
times, partners will focus more on their contribution and knowledge to ensure it is not being
undercut in the deal. Some suggest having line managers work on operating details of alliances
and keeping lawyers removed until later in the discussions (Booz, Allen & Hamilton 1993).
Communication is another challenge for alliance managers to deal with. There needs to
be clear, open and periodic communications because there are cultural challenges and
organizational forces resistant to change. Alliance partners need to explicitly specify objectives
and goals at the initiation of the alliance. With language barriers, time differences and cultural
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sensitivities, objectives may not be set well, and, further, day-to-day alliance managers may have
challenges moving initiatives forward.
Internally firms find difficulty attracting their best individuals to work on alliance issues.
Many perceive it as a high risk career move since individuals who are cast off from the
"mothership" to work on alliances are often left stranded. Procedures need to be in place to put
the best people in alliance projects and rescue them if the alliance turns sour are required to
attract the best talent.
There is also a challenge of one or a few parents being significantly more dominant than
the others. There is danger the smaller partners will disengage with the coordination process.
For example, the Star Alliance, under the implicit leadership of United and Lufthansa, faces this
challenge. The alliance is always in danger of becoming a UA-LH partnership with peripheral
carriers, and this could affect the motivation of the other partners and stability of the alliance as a
whole if these two are not careful.
5.3.3. Customer Complaints About Alliances
As we begin considering customer needs in an alliance context, we will draw upon a
specific customer complaint received at www.eComplaints.com. This complaint is selected
because it serves as an excellent example of many of the things that can go wrong for a customer
in an alliance context. This complaint is paraphrased below from one provided by a customer
who was scheduled to fly from Vancouver, Canada, to Guadalajara, Mexico on a series of Star
Alliance flights in August, 2000. Specifically the itinerary was the following in business/first
class:
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Table 16. Itinerary for Alliance Customer Complaint Drawn from eComplaints
Leave Vancouver 0655 Flight 5110 Air Canada
Arrive San Francisco 0913 (operated by United)
Leave San Francisco 1010 Flight 9740 Air Canada
Arrive Guadalajara 1555 (operated by Mexicana)
Leave Guadalajara 0745 Flight 9739 Air Canada
Arrive Los Angeles 0850 (operated by Mexicana)
Leave Los Angeles 1250 Flight 537 Air Canada
Arrive Vancouver 1530 (operated by Air Canada)
The travelers' story is as follows:
"Upon arrival at the Vancouver airport the morning of departure (we arrived about 2 hours prior departure) the
ticket agent attempted to book our onward flight from San Francisco to Guadalajara but was unable to do so as
the computer system (Star Alliance) was not compatible. Upon arrival at the Air Canada lounge, we checked
with both Air Canada and United representatives and were advised that we would not encounter problems.
During our flight, it became apparent that our arrival would be delayed but, by no more than 15 minutes. As we
approached the gate in San Francisco, we had the stewardess ask the pilot to contact Mexicana (the Star
Alliance onward carrier) and were assured that Mexicana was expecting us. Unfortunately no one could direct
us to the right place. Keep in perspective that United/Mexicana/Air Canada are all partners in Star Alliance ...
why would the United Airlines representatives have no idea where Mexicana was located? You call this a
partnership?
In any event, upon arrival at the Mexicana counter just 30 minutes prior departure for Guadalajara, we were
rudely informed that the gate was closed one hour prior to departure in compliance with international departure
rules and were not boarded. After much ado by Mexicana staff, they finally put us on board UA 2025 San
Francisco to Los Angeles. We were assured that we would be met by their representative at L.A. airport to
assist on meeting our next flight. We were not met by anyone.
We finally boarded Mexicana 917 (from Los Angeles). Needless to say, our friends who had arranged to meet
us at our destination, had long departed and were unable to contact them as we had failed to note their new
telephone number. After an extended frustrating discussion with a Mexicana supervisor we finally obtained a
voucher for an overnight stay at the airport hotel. It was interesting to note that Mexicana was able to ticket us
for the second leg of our journey...
Our return flight ex Guadalajara to L.A. was uneventful until we arrived at L.A. which airport is difficult at best
of times but, being directed to the wrong terminal two times is incomprehensible. Remember, these airlines are
all partners in Star Alliance ... or are they? After about 45 minutes waiting at the carousel for our baggage, we
were advised that our luggage would not be arriving as it had been shipped elsewhere. It was another hour
before we arrived at the counter to formalize the issue.
Two $50.00 travel vouchers does not even begin to compensate us for the aggravation!"
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5.3.4. Seams of Coordination Alliances Must Manage
We examined the customer experience framework introduced in Chapter 1 to identify
seams along which alliances need to work together. An attribute of the customer experience was
classified as a seam of coordination if alliance carriers needed to work together to deliver this
piece of the customer experience. Two major categories of seams were identified: strategic
seams and tactical seams.
Strategic seams are those which involve alliance managers developing similar policies
and procedures. For example, partner airlines must decide on which frequent flier points can be
used towards free tickets. In the oneworld alliance, British Airways and American Airlines have
found this issue on transatlantic flights to be a major strategic barrier to coordination.
Transatlantic flights are important and highly profitable for both carriers, and neither wants to
relinquish any of this traffic to the other carrier. The carriers have solved the coordination
problem by not coordinating. Frequent flier points earned transatlantic on BA flights cannot be
counted as AA frequent flier points, and vice versa. This type of coordination requires
management personnel from headquarters to work together in setting policies. Three strategic
seams of coordination were identified: ticketing, frequent flier points and response to complaints.
Tactical seams are those in which alliances deal with passengers during the days of flight.
These are a combination of information related coordination (check-in, responding to missed
connections) and physical coordination (gate location, luggage transfer). This coordination
involves planning by management personnel at headquarters, but on a day-to-day basis involves
employees, systems and physical assets at all of the even most remote locations of the airlines.
Four operational seams were identified: check-in, connection experience, response to
cancellations and luggage transfer.
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Table 17. Seams of Coordination in an Alliance
* Ticketing: can all ticketing or changes
for entire itinerary be made with each
carrier?
e Frequent flyer points: are points
quickly and correctly recorded for all
segments? Can points be easily
redeemed across the alliance carriers
for upgrades or free tickets?
* Response to complaints: does alliance
quickly respond to complaints in a
satisfactory and coordinated manner?
* Check-in: can all boarding passes and
baggage checking be done at departure
city?
e Connection experience
- How long is walk between
connection gates?
- Do you have to change terminals to
get between connection gates?
- Is connection time short and rushed
or long?
" Response to cancellations /
misconnects: are you easily transferred
to alternative alliance flights?
" Luggage transfer: are bags lost? If so,
are they quickly found?
We selected a subset of attributes from the customer survey that correspond to the set of
negative experiences along the seams of airline alliance coordination. For each seam, the
relevant attributes from our survey are listed below:
Ticketing
" You spend an hour on the phone trying to book your ticket
" The reservation agent on the phone is incompetent when you book or change your ticket
" You cannot get a seat assignment even though you call the airline well in advance of the
flight
Check-In
" You stand in line for an hour trying to check-in
" The check-in agent is incompetent
- The departure lounge (or gate) is packed and there's nowhere to sit
Response to Irregular Operations
" Flight gets cancelled and you get to your destination hours after you expected
" Flight gets cancelled and you wait in line over an hour to rebook
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Strategic Operational
Connection Experience
" When making a connection, you have to claim and recheck luggage
" When making a connection, you can't seem to find the connection gate anywhere
" When making a connection, you have to gate-check carry-ons due to space limits on the
2nd flight
- When making a connection, you have to change terminals
" When making a connection, the walk between gates is extremely long
Luggage Transfer
" The airline loses your checked luggage
" It takes the airlines 5 days to find your missing bags
Response to Complaints
- You complain to the airline and never hear back
Frequent Flyer Points
" Your frequent flyer points are not recorded even though you gave your number at check-
in
" You try to book a vacation with frequent flyer points but no seats are available anywhere
you'd like to go
The results from the survey are shown in the figure below:
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How d
Ticketing
You spend an hour on the phone trying to book your ticket
The reservation agent on the phone is incompetent when you book or change your ticket
You cannot get a seat assignment even though you call the airline well in advance of the flight
Check-In
You stand in line for an hour trying to check-in
The check-in agent is incompetent
The departure lounge (or gate) is packed and there's nowhere to sit
Response to Irregular Operations
Flight gets cancelled and you get to your destination hours after you expected
Flight gets cancelled and you wait in line over an hour to rebook
Making Connections
When making a connection, you have to claim and recheck luggage
When making a connection, you can't seem to find the connection gate anywhere
When making a connection, you have to gate-check carry-ons due to space limits on the 2nd flight
When making a connection, you have to change terminals
When making a connection, the walk between gates is extremely long
Luggage
The airline loses your checked luggagei
It takes the airlines 5 days to find your missing bags
Complaints
You complain to the airline and never hear back
Frequent Flyer Points!
Your frequent flyer points are not recorded even though you gave your number at check-ini
You try to book a vacation with frequent flyer points but no seats are available anywhere you'd like to go
* : Average score for each seam Somewhat
Source: 2001 MIT Global Airline Industry study of business school students Dissatisfied
Figure 14. Attribute Ratings for Airline Alliance Seams
issatisfied would you be if the
following happened to you?
Very
Dissatisfied
5.3.5. Implications to Alliances
The results suggest moving passengers during irregular operations has most impact on
passenger satisfaction in an alliance context. A key question to alliance partners is: who owns
the passenger? In the example above, did Mexicana own the passenger? United? Air Canada?
Employees of each airline need to have proper incentive to ensure appropriate rerouting of
alliance partner passengers. There is a danger on the hand-off of a passenger between partner
carriers during an irregular operation that the first airline may try to get rid of the passenger to
the second carrier, and the second carrier may send the passenger back to the first carrier to have
them fix the problem.
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Extremely
Dissatisfied
am. I
A second key issue for alliance partners to manage is coordination of luggage transfer. In
the summer of 2000, luggage transfer in Amsterdam had many problems, especially between
Northwest and KLM flights, due to capacity limitations and the physical structure of the luggage
transfer system. The problems cost Northwest Airlines millions of dollars in compensation to
passengers whose luggage did not arrive into the U.S. on time on flights from Amsterdam.
Northwest responded by sending fifty baggage handlers from the U.S. for nearly three months to
provide manpower during the busy summer travel months. This resulted in dramatic
improvements in baggage transfer in Amsterdam. The problems, though, created tension
between the two carriers because Northwest felt KLM should have better managed luggage
transfer in Amsterdam. It is important to ensure that baggage handling employees at both
carriers have the proper incentives in place to work for each other. KLM employees in
Amsterdam must have the incentive to get bags onto Northwest aircraft out of Amsterdam as
much as they have incentive to get bags onto KLM aircraft. The challenge to alliance
management is to create the incentive structure to work for the prosperity of the alliance and
have this incentive translate down to all levels of employees.
Surprisingly, the physical connection structure (gate locations, same terminal) was less
important for satisfaction. This is surprising because alliances are publicly speaking about the
importance of proximity in terminal areas. For example, the Star Alliance has openly stated their
desire to become the number one alliance at London's Heathrow. However, Star laments their
inability to co-locate all of their carriers in the same terminal. The customer response in this
survey indicates that, so long as connection times are reasonable, a walk from one terminal to
another is understandable. International alliances imply international connections, which always
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have connection times of at least 1.5 to 2 hours. Assuming the airline is in regular operations
status, the passenger should have no problem making a connection.
It is important to mention that the respondents in our survey are typically single, business
travelers without children. It is likely the issue of proximity could be more important to families,
especially those with small children. However, such a result would not be particularly
compelling to alliance managers since global alliances are in place for the benefit of international
business travelers.
5.4. Conclusions on the Future of Airline Customer Service
It is clear that the major domestic airlines have a good understanding of what causes
dissatisfaction for their customers. The focus of the Customer First plans are consistent with
many of the results from the survey in this study. Issues in our survey like baggage delivery, on-
time performance, customer information and responsiveness to complaints are all included in
their twelve point programs. Other management actions outside of the Customer First plans are
also consistent with our results. Airlines have been installing larger overhead bins, offering
vouchers for lost luggage and utilizing technology solutions to reduce customer waiting in lines.
Airlines conduct their own internal customer satisfaction studies and have an understanding of
the customer that is similar to the results obtained in our research.
The regulatory threat from the government has and will benefit customers. Airline
managers deal with different drivers of airline choice and drivers of customer satisfaction.
Choice is primarily price or schedule driven while satisfaction is driven by operations. Airline
managers hope to avoid regulation, so even the threat of regulation will ensure that airlines
remain sensitive to customer satisfaction issues. Cynics argue that the airline Customer First
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plans are no more than what airlines should be doing anyway, but one should note that the
airlines giving a stated promise of the Customer First program and including it in their contract
of carriage is an improvement from previous airline customer service. In other words, the
airlines are headed in the right direction. The fear of government regulation should continue to
motivate the airlines to pay attention to this issue. Airlines have agreed to ensure compliance
with Customer First plans by establishing performance measures and opening the data to the
Department of Transportation for review. This constant monitoring from the D.O.T. is likely to
be benefit to customer service.
It is important to note that all customer service actions have been self-regulation and
enacted by the airlines themselves. Given that airlines know their customers best, it only makes
sense for them to develop the service plans. However, all corporations constantly need
motivation to cater to the needs of their customers. As David Neeleman, founder of JetBlue,
stated during his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Science, Commerce &
Transportation, "I submit that the answer to many of the problems plaguing today's industry is
not a re-regulation of the industry or laws governing how big an employee's smile ought to be,
but rather the only thing that has ever altered industry behavior in America: the capitalistic cure
known as competition." (Neeleman 2001) In recent years, a number of low-cost airlines have
gone out of business, like Legend in Dallas-Fort Worth and ProAir in Detroit. While it cannot be
proven as such, many would argue that dominant hub carriers American in Dallas and Northwest
in Detroit drove these small carriers to their demise. Leaders of small airlines, like Neeleman,
are pushing the government to ensure that fair competitive practices are in place for start-up
airlines. They specifically request access to slots and gate spaces at some of the busiest airports,
especially those on the east coast. As Neeleman suggests, no government regulation can create
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the incentive for meeting customer needs that a viable competitor can create. Ensuring low-cost
carriers have grounds upon which to compete with the major carriers, particularly in their hubs,
should have a positive impact on the delivery of a high quality customer experience.
While the airlines themselves do not address the importance of labor-management
relations in the customer experience, the government has recognized the issue as important. In
an April 2 5th hearing on the state of airline labor relations, Senator John McCain referred to
negotiations between management and labor as "acrimonious." Research from Gittell, Von
Nordenflycht and Kochan (2001) suggests that airline labor conflict is negatively associated with
service quality. The issue of airline labor relations is only starting to receive extensive public
attention, after the challenges United Airlines faced with their pilots in summer 2000 and the
numerous labor contracts that were bargained in the spring and summer of 2001. Airline
managers and government officials should recognize that among the negative outcomes of
continued strife between labor and management will be depressed levels of customer service and
increased customer dissatisfaction.
We have noted a number of times in this study the importance of on-time airline
operations. On-time performance keeps customers arriving to their destination when they
expect. It reduces stress levels of employees and should minimize customer-employee conflict.
It makes moving baggage accurately to its destination a simpler task for airlines. On-time airline
operations is the heartbeat of running a successful airline. One of the many benefits to airline
managers of good on-time performance is satisfied customers. Airline managers argue that the
antiquated air traffic control system in the U.S. is to blame for excessive delays in recent years.
While the airlines might also be guilty of overscheduling, the improvement of air traffic
management in the U.S. should be the highest priority for improving airline customer service.
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No formal regulation of customer service would be worthwhile until the country has an air traffic
system which can comfortably handle the demand.
An air traffic management system with effective capacity in combination with a
competitive environment that allows start-up low-cost carriers to compete with major carriers is
required for the effective delivery of airline customer service. Airlines need a system which can
effectively move the traffic from point A to point B. This would improve the operations of the
industry, especially improving on-time performance and baggage handling. Effective
competition offers customer an alternative to turn to if an airline does not manage its operations
well, if an airline does not offer competitive fares, if an airline does not provide its customers
with timely information or if an airline's labor relations create a negative culture and operations
disruptions. As discussed above, the threat of service regulation keeps the airlines honest, but
government attention should be dedicated to fostering competition and improving capacity to
ensure the future satisfaction of air travelers.
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Appendix: Customer Survey
Help
zoomerang-
The MIT GLOBAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY Customer
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Afer answering all the questions, click the "submit"
arrow below to complete the survey.
j
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